SHUTE BARRINGTON, LL. D.

LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

MY LORD,

THE following work was undertaken at your Lordship's recommendation, and, amongst other motives, for the purpose of making the most acceptable return that I could, for a great and important benefit conferred upon me.

It may be unnecessary, yet not perhaps quite impertinent, to state to your Lordship, and to the reader, the several inducements that have led me once more to the press. The favour of my first and ever-honoured Patron had put me in possession of so liberal a provision in the Church, as abundantly to satisfy my wants, and much to exceed my pretensions. Your Lordship's munificence, in conjunction with that of some other excellent Prelates, who regarded my services with the partiality with which your Lordship was pleased to consider them, hath since placed me in ecclesiastical situations, more than adequate to every object of reasonable ambition. In the mean time, a weak, and, of late, a painful state of health, deprived me of the power of discharging the duties of my station in a manner at all suitable, either to my sense of those duties, or to my most anxious wishes concerning them. My inability for the public functions of my profession, amongst other consequences, left me much at leisure. That leisure was not to be lost. It was only in my study that I could repair my deficiencies in the church; it was only through the press that I could speak. These circumstances entitled your Lordship, in particular, to call upon me for the only species of exertion of which I was capable, and disposed me without hesitation to obey the call in the best manner that I could. In the choice of a subject, I had no place left for doubt: in saying which, 1 do not so much refer, either to the supreme importance of the subject, or to any scepticism concerning it with which the present times are charged, as 1 do to its connexion with the subjects treated of in my former publications. The following discussion alone was wanted to make up my works into a system in which works, such as they are, the public have now before them, the evidences of Natural Religion, the evidences of Revealed Religion, and an account of the duties that result from both. It is of small importance that they have been written in an order the very reverse of that in which they ought to be read. I commend, therefore, the present volume to your Lordship's protection, not only as, in all probability, my last labour, but as the completion of a regular and comprehensive design.

Hitherto, my Lord, I have been speaking of myself, and not of my Patron. Your Lordship wants not the testimony of a Dedication; nor any testimony from me: I consult therefore the impulse of my own mind alone when I declare, that in no respect has my intercourse with your Lordship been more gratifying to me, than in the opportunities which it has afforded me, of observing your earnest, active, and unwearied solicitude, for the advancement of substantial Christianity; a solicitude, nevertheless, accompanied with that candour of mind, which suffers no subordinate differences of opinion, when there is a co-incidence in the main intention and object, to produce any alienation of esteem, or diminution of favour. It is fortunate for a country, and honourable to its government, when qualities and dispositions like these are placed in high and influencing stations. Such is the sincere judgment which I have formed of your Lordship's character and of its public value: my personal obligations I can never forget. Under a due sense of both these considerations, I beg leave to subscribe myself, with great respect and gratitude,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's faithful and most devoted servant,
WILLIAM PALEY.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT.

and understand it; but being once, as we have (posed, namely, that there were parts which said, observed and understood,) the inference might be spared, without prejudice to the we think is inevitable, that the watch must movement of the watch, and that we had prohave had a maker; that there must have ex-ved this by experiment, these superfluous isted, at some time, and at some place or other, parts, even if we were completely assured that an artificer or artificers who formed it for the they were such, would not vacate the reasonpurpose which we find it actually to answer;ing which we had instituted concerning other who comprehended its construction, and de- parts. The indication of contrivance remainsigned its use. ed, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, viz. of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's more satisfaction, to be answered, that there skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises existed in things a principle of order, which no doubt in our minds of the existence and had disposed the parts of the watch into their agency of such an artist, at some former time, present form and situation. He never knew and in some place or other. Nor can I per- a watch made by the principle of order; norl ceive that it varies at all the inference, whe- can he even form to himself an idea of what is ther the question arise concerning a human meant by a principle of order, distinct from agent, or concerning an agent of a different the intelligence of the watchmaker. species, or an agent possessing, in some respects, a different nature.

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made: still less necessary, where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at all.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so:

VII. And not less surprised to be inform ed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more. than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law, as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent ; for it is only the mode, according to which an agent proceeds: it implies a power; for it is the order, according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does no thing, is nothing. The expression," the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as "the law of vegeta"the law of animal nature," or

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which ble nature," we could not ascertain, whether they conduc- indeed as "the law of nature," in general, ed to that effect in any manner whatever. For, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in as to the first branch of the case; if by the exclusion of agency and power; or when it is loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in ques-substituted into the place of these. tion, the movement of the watch were found VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retard-be driven out of his conclusion, or from his ed, no doubt would remain in our minds as to confidence in its truth, by being told that he the utility or intention of these parts, although knew nothing at all about the matter. He we should be unable to investigate the man- knows enough for his argument: he knows ner according to which, or the connexion by the utility of the end: he knows the subserwhich, the ultimate effect depended upon their viency and adaptation of the means to the end. action or assistance; and the more complex is These points being known, his ignorance of the machine, the more likely is this obscurity other points, his doubts concerning other to arise. Then, as to the second thing sup- points, affect not the certainty of his reason.

Ing. The consciousness of knowing little, need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

CHAPTER II.

STATE OF THE ARGUMENT CONTINUED.

gence, an effect is produced, viz. the corn is ground. But the effect results from the arrangement. The force of the stream cannot be said to be the cause or author of the effect, still less of the arrangement. Understanding and plan in the formation of the mill were not the less necessary, for any share which the water has in grinding the corn; yet is this share the same, as that which the watch would have contributed to the production of the new watch, upon the supposition assumed in the last section. Therefore,

III. Though it be now no longer probable, that the individual watch, which our observer had found, was made immediately by the hand of an artificer, yet doth not this alteration in anywise affect the inference, that an artificer had been originally employed and concerned in the production. The argument from design remains as it was. Marks of design and contrivance are no more accounted for now, than they were before. In the same thing, we may ask for the cause of different properties. We may ask for the cause of the colour of a body, of its hardness, of its heat; and these causes may be all different. We are now asking for the cause of that subserviency to a use, that relation to an end, which we have No an

SUPPOSE, in the next place, that the person who found the watch, should, after some time, discover, that in addition to all the properties which he had hitherto observed in it, it possessed the unexpected property of produeing, in the course of its movement, another watch like itself (the thing is conceivable ;) that it contained within it a mechanism, a system of parts, a mould for instance, or a complex adjustment of laths, files, and other tools, evidently and separately calculated for this purpose; let us inquire, what effect ought such a discovery to have upon his former conclusion. I. The first effect would be to increase his admiration of the contrivance, and his conviction of the consummate skill of the contriver. Whether he regarded the object of the contrivance, the distinct apparatus, the intricate, yet in many parts intelligible mechanism, by which it was carried on, he would perceive, remarked, in the watch before us. in this new observation, nothing but an addi-swer is given to this question, by telling us. tional reason for doing what he had already done, for referring the construction of the watch to design, and to supreme art. If that construction without this property, or, which is the same thing, before this property had been noticed, proved intention and art to have been employed about it; still more strong would the proof appear, when he came to the knowledge of this farther property, the crown and perfection of all the rest.

that a preceding watch produced it. There cannot be design without a designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order, without choice; arrangement, without any thing cacable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. No one, therefore, can rationally believe, that the insensible, inanimate watch, from which the watch before us issued, was the proper cause of the mechanism we so much admire in it ;-could be truly said to have constructed the instrument, disposed its parts, assigned their office, determined their order, action, and mutual dependency, combined their several motions into one result, and that also a result connected with the utilities of other beings. All these properties, therefore, are as much unaocounted for as they were before.

II. He would reflect, that though the watch before him were, in some sense, the maker of the watch, which was fabricated in the course of its movements, yet it was in a very different sense from that, in which a carpenter, for instance, is the maker of a chair; the author of its contrivance, the cause of the relation of its parts to their use. /With respect to these, the first watch was no cause at all to the second; in no such sense as this was it the author of the constitution and order, either of the parts which the new watch contained, or of the parts by the aid and instrumentality of which it was produced. We might possibly say, but with great latitude of expression, that a stream of water ground corn; but no lati- IV. Nor is any thing gained by running the tude of expression would allow us to say, no difficulty farther back, i. c. by supposing the stretch of conjecture could lead us to think, watch before us to have been produced from that the stream of water built the mill, though another watch, that from a former, and so on it were too ancient for us to know who the indefinitely. Our going back ever so far, builder was. What the stream of water does brings us no nearer to the least degree of sain the affair, is neither more nor less than this; tisfaction upon the subject. Contrivance is by the application of an unintelligent impulse still unaccounted for. We still want a con.. to a mechanism previously arranged, arranged triver. A designing mind is neither supplied independently of it, and arranged by intelli- by this supposition, nor dispensed with. If

the difficulty were diminished the farther we I think it is not, for unorganized bodies to went back, by going back indefinitely we might spring from one another,) or by individual perexhaust it. And this is the only case to which petuity. But that is not the question now. this sort of reasoning applies. Where there To suppose it to be so, is to suppose that it is a tendency, or, as we increase the number made no difference whether he had found a of terms, a continual approach towards a li- watch or a stone. As it is, the metaphysics of mit, there, by supposing the number of terms that question have no place; for, in the watch to be what is called infinite, we may conceive which we are examining, are seen contrivance, the limit to be attained: but where there is design; an end, a purpose; means for the end, no such tendency or approach, nothing is ef- adaptation to the purpose. And the question) fected by lengthening the series. There is no which irresistibly presses upon our thoughts difference as to the point in question (what is, whence this contrivance and design? The ever there may be as to many points,) between thing required is the intending mind, the adaptone series and another; between a series which ing hand, the intelligence by which that hand is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain, was directed. The question, this demand, is composed of an infinite number of links, can is not shaken off, by increasing a number or no more support itself, than a chain composed succession of substances, destitute of these proof a finite number of links. And of this we perties; nor the more, by increasing that numare assured (though we never can have tried ber to infinity. If it be said, that, upon the the experiment,) because, by increasing the supposition of one watch being produced from number of links, from ten for instance to a another in the course of that other's movehundred, from a hundred to a thousand, &c. ments, and by means of the mechanism withwe make not the smallest approach, we observe in it, we have a cause for the watch in my not the smallest tendency, towards self-sup- hand, viz. the watch from which it proceeded: port. There is no difference in this respect I deny, that for the design, the contrivance, (yet there may be a great difference in seve- the suitableness of means to an end, the adapral respects) between a chain of a greater or tation of instruments to a use (all which we dis less length, between one chain and another, cover in the watch,) we have any cause what between one that is finite and one that is in- ever. It is in vain, therefore, to assign a sefinite. This very much resembles the case be- ries of such causes, or to allege that a series fore us. The machine which we are inspect- may be carried back to infinity; for I do not ing, demonstrates, by its construction, contri- admit that we have yet any cause at all of the vance and design. Contrivance must have phenomena, still less any series of causes either had a contriver; design, a designer; whether finite or infinite. Here is contrivance, but no the machine immediately proceeded from an- contriver; proofs of design, but no designer. other machine or not. That circumstance al- V. Our observer would farther also reflect ters not the case. That other machine may, that the maker of the watch before him, was, in like manner, have proceeded from a former in truth and reality, the maker of every watch machine: nor does that alter the case; con- produced from it; there being no difference trivance must have had a contriver. That (except that the latter manifests a more exformer one from one preceding it: no altera-quisite skill) between the making of another tion still; a contriver is still necessary. No watch with his own hands, by the mediation tendency is perceived, no approach towards a of files, lathes, chisels, &c. and the disposing, diminution of this necessity It is the same fixing, and inserting of these instruments, or with any and every succession of these ma- of others equivalent to them, in the body of cnines; a succession of ten, of a hundred, of the watch already made, in such a manner, as a thousand; with one series, as with another to form a new watch in the course of the a series which is finite, as with a series which movements which he had given to the old one. is infinite. In whatever other respects they It is only working by one set of tools, instead may differ, in this they do not. In all equally, of another.

contrivance and design are unaccounted for. The conclusion which the first examination The question is not simply, How came the of the watch, of its works, construction, and first watch into existence? which question, movement, suggested, was, that it must have it may be pretended, is done away by suppos-had, for the cause and author of that construcing the series of watches thus produced from tion, an artificer, who understood its mechaone another to have been infinite, and conse- nism, and designed its use. This conclusion is quently to have had no such first, for which invincible. A second examination presents us it was necessary to provide a cause. This, per-with a new discovery. The watch is found, haps, would have been nearly the state of in the course of its movement, to produce anothe question, if nothing had been before us ther watch, similar to itself; and not only so, but an unorganized, unmechanized substance, but we perceive in it a system or organisation, without mark or indication of contrivance. separately calculated for that purpose. What It might be difficult to show that such sub. effect would this discovery have, or ought it to stance could not have existed from eternity, have, upon our former inference? What, as either in succession, (if it were possible, which hath already been said, but to increase, beyond