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CHAPTER V.

THE DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

WHEN God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both.

calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever) said; This is to irritate, this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys: this gland to secrete the humour which forms the gout if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is, that it is useless: no one ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or to torment. Since then God hath called forth1 If he had wished our misery, he might have his consummate wisdom to contrive and promade sure of his purpose, by forming our senses vide for our happiness, and the world appears to be so many sores and pains to us, as they are to have been constituted with this design at now instruments of gratification and enjoy-first; so long as this constitution is upholden ment: or by placing us amidst objects so ill- by him, we must in reason suppose the same suited to our perceptions, as to have continually design to continue. offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. He might have made, for example, every thing we tasted, bitter; every thing we saw, loathsome; every thing we touched, a sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord.

The contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect, upon which the eye rests; a single example, perhaps by which each man finds himself more convineed than by all others put together. I seem for my own part, to see the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very

If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is ex-young children, than in any thing in the world. cluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But either of these (and still more both of them) being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness; and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view, and for that pur. pose.

The pleasures of grown persons may be reck-
oned partly of their own procuring; especially
if there has been any industry, or contrivance,
or pursuit, to come at them; or if they are
founded, like music, painting, &c. upon any
qualification of their own acquiring. But the
pleasures of a healthy infant are so manifestly
provided for it by another, and the benevolence
of the provision is so unquestionable, that every
child I see at its sport, affords to my mind a
kind of sensible evidence of the finger of God,
| and of the disposition which directs it.

The same argument may be proposed in dif-
ferent terms, thus: Contrivance proves design:
and the predominant tendency of the contriv.
ance indicates the disposition of the designer.
The world abounds with contrivances: and all
the contrivances which we are acquainted with,
are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no
doubt, exists; but is never, that we can per-
ceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are con
trived to eat, not to ache; their aching now
and then, is incidental to the contrivance, per-
haps inseparable from it: or even, if you will,
Let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but
it is not the object of it. This is a distinction"
which well deserves to be attended to. In des-
cribing implements of husbandry, you would" the general happiness."
hardly say of the sickle, that it is made to cut
(the reaper's fingers, though, from the construc-
tion of the instrument, and the manner of us-
ing it, this mischief often happens. But if you
had occasion to describe instruments of torture
or execution, This engine, you would say, is to
extend the sinews; this to dislocate the joints;
this to break the bones; this to scorch the soles
of the feet. Here, pain and misery are the
very objects of the contrivance. Now, nothing

But the example, which strikes each man) most strongly, is the true example for him: and hardly two minds hit upon the same; which shows the abundance of such examples about us.

We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish

CHAPTER VI.

UTILITY.

So then actions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient, is right. of this sort is to be found in the works of na-ing to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious * Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, accord ture. We never discover a train of contriv-according to his design Thus, if the question be, Whe ance to bring about an evil purpose. No ana-ther relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the tendency of such a conduct to the public tomist ever discovered a system of organization advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whe

It is the utilty of any moral rule alone, which | But as this solution supposes, that the mo constitutes the obligation of it. ral government of the world must proceed by general rules, it remains that we show the necessity of this.

But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions, in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful. The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or oppress, all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to dispatch such a one as soon as possible out of the way; as the neigh bourhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor. It might be useful to rob a miser, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness, by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen distressed families, than by continuing locked up in a miser's chest. It may be useful to get possession of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat in parliament, by bribery or false swearing: as by means of them we may serve the public more effectually than in our private station. What then shall we say? Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be to justify assassination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without shewing a difference between them. Consequently, the same sort of actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them.

Thus, to return once more to the case of the assassin. The assassin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him better out of the way than in it. If you allow this excuse in the present instance, you must allow it to all who act in the same manner, and from the said motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill any one he meets, whom he thinks noxious or useless; which, in the event, would be to commit every man's life and safety to the spleen, fury, and fanaticism, of his neighbour;-a disposition of affairs which would soon fill the world with misery and confusion; and ere long put an end to human society, if not to the human species. The necessity of general rules in human goTo see this point perfectly, it must be ob-vernment apparent; but whether the same served that the bad consequences of actions, are twofold, particular and general.

It is not necessary to do either. The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right.

The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions.

The general bad consequence is, the viola. tion of some necessary or useful general rule. Thus, the particular bad consequence of the assassination above described, is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent; the loss he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man, as to a good one, or more so; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occasion, to his family, friends, and de. pendants.

necessity subsist in the Divine economy, in that distribution of rewards and punishments to which a moralist looks forward, may be doubted.

I answer, that general rules are necessary to every moral government: and by moral government I mean any dispensation, whose object is to influence the conduct of reasonable creatures.

For if, of two actions perfectly similar, one be punished, and the other be rewarded or forgiven, which is the consequence of rejecting general rules, the subjects of such a dispensation would no longer know, either what to expect or how to act. Rewards and punThe general bad consequence is the viola-ishments would cease to be such,—would betion of this necessary general rule, that no man come accidents. Like the stroke of a thunbe put to death for his crimes but by public derbolt, or the discovery of a mine, like a blank authority. or a benefit-ticket in a lottery, they would occasion pain or pleasure when they happened; but, following in no known order, from any particular course of action, they could have no previous influence or effect upon the conduct.

Although, therefore, such an action have no particular bad consequences, or greater particular good consequences, yet it is not useful, by reason of the general consequence, which is of more importance, and which is evil. And the same of the other two instances, and of a million more which might be mentioned. ther a man remarkable for this sort of bounty is to be esteemed virtuous for that reason? we inquire into his design, whether his liberality sprang from charity or from ostentation? It is evident that our concern is with tions in the abstract.

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An attention to general rules, therefore, is included in the very idea of reward and punishment. Consequently, whatever reason there is to expect future reward and punishment at the hand of God, there is the same reason to believe, that he will proceed in the distribu. tion of it by general rules.

generally permitted. But suppose they were, and a thousand such actions perpetrated under: this permission; is it just to charge a single

Before we prosecute the consideration of general consequences any further, it may be pro-action with the collected guilt and mischief of per to anticipate a reflection, which will be apt enough to suggest itself, in the progress of our argument.

the whole thousand? I answer, that the reason for prohibiting and punishing an action (and this reason may be called the guilt of the action, if you please) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arise from the general impunity and toleration of actions of the same sort.

"Whatever is expedient is right." But then it must be expedient on the whole, at the

As the general consequence of an action, upon which so much of the guilt of a bad action depends, consists in the example; it should seem, that if the action be done with perfect secrecy, so as to furnish no bad example, that part of the guilt drops off. In the case of suicide, for instance, if a man can so manage mat-long run, in all its effects collateral and reters, as to take away his own life, without being known or suspected to have done so, he is not chargeable with any mischief from the example; nor does his punishment seem necessary, in order to save the authority of any general rule.

In the first place, those who reason in this manner do not observe, that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the least to be endured; namely, that secrecy, whenever secrecy is practicable, will justify any action.

Were such a rule admitted, for instance, in the case above produced; is there not reason to fear that people would be disappearing perpetually ?

In the next place, I would wish them to be well satisfied about the points proposed in the following queries:

1. Whether the Scriptures do not teach us to expect that, at the general judgment of the world, the most secret actions will be brought to light ?"

mote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way or at what distance they ensue.

To impress this doctrine on the minds of young readers, and to teach them to extend their views beyond the immediate mischief of a crime, I shall here subjoin a string of instances, in which the particular consequence is comparatively insignificant; and where the malignity of the crime, and the severity with which human laws pursue it, is almost entirely founded upon the general consequence.

The particular consequence of coining is, the loss of a guinea, or of half a guinea, to the person who receives the counterfeit money: the general consequence (by which I mean the consequence that would ensue, if the same practice were generally permitted) is, to abolish the use of money.

The particular consequence of forgery is, a damage of twenty or thirty pounds to the man who accepts the forged bill: the general con

2. For what purpose can this be, but to make them the objects of reward and punish-sequence is, the stoppage of paper-currency. ment?

3. Whether, being so brought to light, they will not fall under the operation of those equal and impartial rules, by which God will deal with his creatures?

The particular consequence of sheep-stealing, or horse-stealing, is a loss to the owner, to the amount of the value of the sheep or horse stolen: the general consequence is, that the land could not be occupied, nor the market supplied, with this kind of stock.

They will then become examples, whatever they be now; and require the same treatment from the judge and governor of the morala world, as if they had been detected from the first.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL
CONSEQUENCES PURSUED.

The general consequence of any action may be estimated, by asking what would be the consequence, if the same sort of actions were

"In the day when God shall Judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." Rom. xi. 16. Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the heart." 1 Cor. iv. 5.

The particular consequence of breaking into house empty of inhabitants, is, the loss of a pair of silver candlesticks, or a few spoons: the general consequence is, that nobody could leave their house empty.

The particular consequence of smuggling may be a deduction from the national fund too minute for computation: the general consequence is, the destruction of one entire branch of public revenue; a proportionable increase of the burthen upon other branches; and the ruin of all fair and open trade in the article smuggled.

The particular consequence of an officer's breaking his parole is, the loss of a prisoner, who was possibly not worth keeping the general consequence is, that this mitigation of captivity would be refused to all others.

And what proves incontestably the superior importance of general consequences is, that

D

Now, because moral obligation depends, as we have seen, upon the will of God; right, which is correlative to it, must depend upon the same. Right therefore signifies, consistency with the will of God.

crimes are the same, and treated in the same | If one man has "a right" to an estate, othera manner, though the particular consequence be are "obliged" to abstain from it :-If parents very different. The crime and fate of the have a "right" to reverence from their chilhouse-breaker is the same, whether his booty dren, children are" obliged" to reverence their be five pounds or fifty. And the reason is, parents:—and so in all other instances. that the general consequence is the same. The want of this distinction between particular and general consequences, or rather, the not sufficiently attending to the latter, is the cause of that perplexity which we meet with in ancient moralists. On the one hand, they were sensible of the absurdity of pronouncing actions good or evil, without regard to the good or evil they produced. On the other hand, they were startled at the conclusions to which a steady adherence to consequences seemed sometimes to conduct them. To relieve this difficulty, they contrived the rò giro, or the honestum, by which terms they meant to constitute a measure of right, distinct from utility. Whilst the utile served them, that is, whilst it corresponded with their habitual notions of the rectitude of actions, they went by it. When they fell in with such cases as those mentioned in the sixth chapter, they took leave of their guide, and resorted to the honestum. The only account they could give of the matter was, that these actions might be useful; but, because they were not at the same time honesta, they were by no means to be deemed just or right.

But if the Divine will determine the distinc-[ tion of right and wrong, what else is it but an identical proposition, to say of God, that he acts right? or how is it possible to conceive even that he should act wrong? Yet these assertions are intelligible and significant. The case is this: By virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclusions; which conclusions become rules; and we soon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any further: and when the habit is once established of stopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with these rules even the Divine conduct itself; and yet it may be true (only not observed by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the Divine will.

Right is a quality of persons or of actions Of persons; as when we say, such a one has a ex-"right" to this estate; parents have a "right" to reverence from their children; the king to allegiance from his subjects; masters have "right" to their servants' labour; a man has not a "right" over his own life.

From the principles delivered in this and the two preceding chapters, a maxim may be plained, which is in every man's mouth, and in most men's without meaning, viz. "not to do evil, that good may come :" that is, let us not violate a general rule, for the sake of any particular good consequence we may expect. Which is for the most part a salutary caution, the advantage seldom compensating for the violation of the rule. Strictly speaking, that cannot be "evil," from which "good comes;" but in this way, and with a view to the dis-" tinction between particular and general consequences, it may.

Of actions; as in such expressions as the following: it is "right" to punish murder with death; his behaviour on that occasion was "right;" it is not "right" to send an unfortunate debtor to jail; he did or acted right," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgment.

In this latter set of expressions, you may We will conclude this subject of consequences substitute the definition of right above given, with the following reflection. A man may ima- for the term itself: e. g. it is "consistent with gine, that any action of his, with respect to the will of God to punish murder with death; the public, must be inconsiderable: so also is his behaviour on that occasion was "consistthe agent. If his crime produce but a small ent with the will of God;"—it is not "coneffect upon the universal interest, his punish-sistent with the will of God” to send an unforment or destruction bears a small proportion to the sum of happiness and misery in the creation.

CHAPTER IX.

tunate debtor to gaol;-he did, or acted, "consistently with the will of God," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgment.

In the former set, you must vary the construction a little, when you introduce the definition instead of the term. Such a one has a "right" to this estate, that is, it is "consistent with the will of God" that such a one should have it ;-parents have a right" to reverence from their children, that is, it is RIGHT and obligation are reciprocal; that" consistent with the will of God" that chilis, wherever there is a right in one person, dren should reverence their parents;—and the there is a corresponding obligation upon others. | same of the rest.

OF RIGHT.

66

CHAPTER X

THE DIVISION OF RIGHTS.

RIGHTS, when applied to persons, are

Natural or adventitious:
Alienable or unalienable :
Perfect or imperfect.

I. Rights are natural or adventitious. Natural rights are such as would belong to man, although there subsisted in the world no civil government whatever.

or violence, as if it had been assigned to him,
like the partition of the country amongst the
twelvetribes, by the immediate designation and
appointment of Heaven.

II. Rights are alienable or unalienable.
Which terms explain themselves.

The right we have to most of those things which we call property, as houses, lands, money, &c. is alienable.

The right of a prince over his people, of a husband over his wife, of a master over his servant, is generally and naturally unalien. able.

able.

The distinction depends upon the mode of acquiring the right. If the right originate from Adventitious rights are such as would not. a contract, and be limited to the person by the Natural rights are, a man's right to his life, express terms of the contract, or by the comlimbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of mon interpr cation of such contracts (which is his personal labour; to the use, in common equivalent to an express stipulation), or by a with others, of air, light, water. If a thou-personal condition annexed to the right; then sand different persons, from a thousand differ. it is unalienable. In all other cases it is alienent corners of the world, were cast together upon a desert island, they would from the first The right to civil liberty is alienable; though be every one entitled to these rights. in the vehemence of men's zeal for it, and the Adventitious rights are, the right of a king language of some political remonstrances, it has over his subjects; of a general over his sol-often been pronounced to be an unalienable diers; of a judge over the life and liberty of a prisoner; a right to elect or appoint magistrates, to impose taxes, decide disputes, direct the descent or disposition of property; a right, in a word, in any one man, or particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the rest. For none of these rights would exist in the newly-inhabited island.

right. The true reason why mankind hold in detestation the memory of those who have sold their liberty to a tyrant, is, that, together with their own, they sold commonly, or endangered, the liberty of others; which certainly they had no right to dispose of.

III. Rights are perfect or imperfect. Perfect rights may be asserted by force, or, what in civil society comes into the place of private force, by course of law.

Imperfect rights may not.

Examples of perfect rights.-A man's right to his life, person, house; for, if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by instant violence, or punish the aggressor by law: a man's right to his estate, furniture, clothes, money, and to all ordinary articles of property; for, if they be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the author of the injury to make restitution or satisfaction.

And here it will be asked, how adventitious rights are created; or, which is the same thing, how any new rights can accrue from the establishment of civil society; as rights of all kinds, we remember, depend upon the will of God, and civil society is but the ordinance and institution of man? For the solution of this difficulty, we must return to our first principles. God wills the happiness of mankind; and the existence of civil society, as conducive to that happiness. Consequently, many things, which are useful for the support of civil society in general, or for the conduct and conversation Examples of imperfect rights.-In elections of particular societies already established, are, or appointments to offices, where the qualififor that reason, 66 consistent with the will of cations are prescribed, the best qualified canGod," or 66 right," which, without that rea-didate has a right to success; yet, if he be reson, i. e. without the establishment of civil so-jected, he has no remedy. He can neither ciety, would not have been so. seize the office by force, nor obtain redress at From whence also it appears, that adventi- law; his right therefore is imperfect. A poor tious rights, though immediately derived from neighbour has a right to relief; yet, if it be human appointment, are not, for that reason, refused him, he must not extort it. A beneless sacred than natural rights, nor the obliga-factor has a right to returns of gratitude from tion to respect them less cogent. They both the person he has obliged; yet, if he meet ultimately rely upon the same authority, the with none, he must acquiesce. Children have will of God. Such a man claims a right to a a right to affection and education from their particular estate. He can show, it is true, no- parents; and parents, on their part, to duty thing for his right, but a rule of the civil com- and reverence from their children; yet, if munity to which he belongs; and this rule may these rights be on either side withholden, there be arbitrary, capricious, and absurd. Notwith-is no compulsion by which they can be enforced. standing all this, there would be the same sin It may be at first view difficult to apprehend in dispossessing the man of his estate by craft how a person should have a right to a thing,

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