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"of mankind" is the subject; the "will of man, who has to reason about his duty, when “God," the rule; and "everlasting happi-the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is ness," the motive, of human virtue.

almost sure to reason himself into an error.

If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits; Where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue, the guilt of vice, or any use of moral and religious knowledge? I answer, in the forming and contracting of these habits.

Virtue has been divided by some moralists into benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and tem perance. Benevolence proposes good ends; prudence suggests the best means of attaining them; fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements, which And hence results a rule of life of considerstand in our way in the pursuit of these ends; able importance, viz. that many things are to temperance repels and overcomes the passions be done and abstained from, solely for the sake that obstruct it. Benevolence, for instance, of habit. We will explain ourselves by an ex. prompts us to undertake the cause of an op-ample or two-A beggar, with the appearance pressed orphan; prudence, suggests the best means of going about it; fortitude enables us to confront the danger, and bear up against the loss, disgrace, or repulse, that may attend our undertaking; and temperance keeps under the love of money, of ease, or amusement, which might divert us from it.

of extreme distress, asks our charity. If we come to argue the matter, whether the distress be real, whether it be not brought upon himself, whether it be of public advantage to admit such application, whether it be not to encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether it may not invite impostors to our doors, whether the Virtue is distinguished by others into two money can be well spared, or might not be betbranches only, prudence and benevolence: pru-ter applied; when these considerations are put dence, attentive to our own interest; benevo- together, it may appear very doubtful, whether lence, to that of our fellow-creatures: both directed to the same end, the increase of happiness in nature; and taking equal concern in the future as in the present.

The four CARDINAL virtues are, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.

But the division of virtue, to which we are in modern times most accustomed, is into du

ties;

Towards God; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c.

Towards other men (or relative duties); as justice, charity, fidelity, loyalty, &c.

Towards ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preservation of life, care of health, &c.

More of these distinctions have been proposed, which it is not worth while to set down.

I shall proceed to state a few observations, which relate to the general regulation of human conduct; unconnected indeed with each other, but very worthy of attention; and which fall as properly under the title of this chapter as of any future one.

I. Mankind act more from habit than reflection.

It is on few only and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse, which is the effect and energy of pre-established habits. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigencies of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is oftentimes little eisure for reflection; and were there more, a

we ought or ought not to give any thing. But when we reflect, that the misery before our eyes excites our pity, whether we will or not; that it is of the utmost consequence to us to cultivate this tenderness of mind; that it is ,| a quality, cherished by indulgence, and soon stifled by opposition; when this, I say, is considered, a wise man will do that for his own sake, which he would have hesitated to do for the petitioner's; he will give way to his compassion, rather than offer violence to a habit of so much general use.

A man of confirmed good habits, will act in the same manner without any consideration at all.

This may serve for cne instance; another is the following —A man has been brought up from his infancy with a dread of lying. An occasion presents itself where, at the expense of a little veracity, he may divert his company, set off his own wit with advantage, attract the notice and engage the partiality of all about him. This is not a small temptation. And when he looks at the other side of the question, he sees no mischief that can ensue from this liberty, no slander of any man's reputation, no prejudice likely to arise to any man's interest. Were there nothing further to be considered, it would be difficult to show why a man under such circumstances might not indulge his hu. mour. But when he reflects that his scruples about lying have hitherto preserved him free from this vice; that occasions like the present will return, where the inducement may be equally strong, but the indulgence much less innocent; that his scruples will wear away by a few transgressions, and leave him subject to one of the meanest and most pernicious of all bad habits,—a habit of lying, whenever it will serve his turn: when all this, I say, is considered, a wise man will forego the present, or a much greater pleasure, rather than lay the

foundation of a character so vicious and con- ! prepared for us rewards and punishments, of temptible.

From what has been said, may be explained also the nature of habitual virtue. By the definition of virtue, placed at the beginning of this chapter, it appears, that the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive and end, of all virtue. Yet, in fact, a man shall perform many an act of virtue, without having either the good of mankind, the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thought. How is this to be understood? In the same manner as that a man may be a very good servant, without being conscious, at every turn, of a particular regard to his master's will, or of an express attention to his master's interest: indeed, your best old servants are of this sort: but then he must have served for a length of time under the actual direction of these motives, to bring it to this: in which service, his merit and virtue consist.

all possible degrees, from the most exalted bap piness down to extreme misery; so that “our labour is never in vain ;" whatever advancement we make in virtue, we procure a proportionable accession of future happiness; as, on the other hand, every accumulation of vice is the "treasuring up so much wrath against the day of wrath." It has been said, that it can never be a just economy of Providence, to admit one part of mankind into heaven, and condemn the other to hell; since there must be very little to choose, between the worst man who is received into heaven, and the best who is excluded. And how know we, it might be answered, but that there may be as little to choose in the conditions?

Without entering into a detail of Scripture morality, which would anticipate our subject, the following general positions may be advanc ed, I think, with safety.

I. That a state of happiness is not to be exThere are habits, not only of drinking, pected by those who are conscious of no moral swearing, and lying, and of some other things, or religious rule: I mean those who cannot which are commonly acknowledged to be ha- with truth say, that they have been prompted bits, and called so; but of every modification to one action, or withholden from one gratifi. of action, speech, and thought. Man is a bun-cation, by any regard to virtue or religion, eidle of habits. ther immediate or habitual. There are habits of industry, attention, vi- There needs no other proof of this, than the gilance, advertency; of a prompt obedience to consideration, that a brute would be as proper the judgment occurring, or of yielding to the an object of reward as such a man, and that, first impulse of passion; of extending our views if the case were so, the penal sanctions of reto the future, or of resting upon the present; ligion could have no place. For, whom would of apprehending, methodising, reasoning; of you punish, if you make such a one as this indolence and dilatoriness; of vanity, self-con- happy?-or rather indeed religion itself, both ceit, melancholy, partiality; of fretfulness, sus- natural and revealed, would cease to have eipicion, captiousness, censoriousness; of pride, ther use or authority. ambition, covetousness; of over-reaching, intriguing, projecting: in a word, there is not a quality or function, either of body or mind, which does not feel the influence of this great law of animated nature.

II. The Christian religion hath not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation.

2. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those, who reserve to themselves the habitual practice of any one sin, or neglect of one known duty.

Because, no obedience can proceed upon proper motives, which is not universal, that is, which is not directed to every command of God alike, as they all stand upon the same autho

world.

This has been made an objection to Chris-rity. tianity; but without reason. For as all reve- Because such an allowance would in effect iation, however imparted originally, must be amount to a toleration of every vice in the transmitted by the ordinary vehicle of language, it behoves those who make the objection, to And because the strain of Scripture language show that any form of words could be devised, excludes any such hope. When our duties are that might express this quantity; or that it is recited, they are put collectively, that is, as all possible to constitute a standard of moral at- and every one of them required in the Christainments, accommodated to the almost infi-tian character. "Add to your faith virtue, and nite diversity which subsists in the capacities to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temand opportunities of different men.

It seems most agreeable to our conceptions of justice, and is consonant enough to the language of scripture, to suppose, that there are

perance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly

stripes." Luke xii. 47, 48.-"Whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ; verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his re"He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also sparing-ward;" to wit, intimating that there is in reserve a proly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also portionable reward for even the smallest act of virtue. bountifully." 2 Cor. ix. 6.-" And that servant which Mark ix. 41-See also the parable of the pounds, Luke knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither xix. 16, &c. ; where he whose pound had gained ten dir according to his will, shall be beaten with many pounds, was placed over ten cities; and he whose pound stripes; but he that knew not, shall be beaten with few had gained five pounds, was placed over five cities.

kindness, and to brotherly kindness charity":"| which we doubt, whatever it may be in itself, On the other hand, when vices are enumerated, or to another, would, in us, whilst this doubt they are put disjunctively, that is, as separately remains upon our minds, be certainly sinful. and severally excluding the sinner from hea- The case is expressly so adjudged by St. Paul, ven. "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor with whose authority we will for the present adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of them-rest contented. "I know and am persuaded selves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of heavent." Those texts of Scripture, which seem to lean a contrary way, as that "charity shall cover the multitude of sins ‡;" that "he which converteth a sinner from the error of his way, shall hide a multitude of sins §;" cannot, I think, for the reasons above mentioned, be extended to sins deliberately, habitually, and obstinately persisted in.

3. That a state of mere unprofitableness will not go unpunished.

This is expressly laid down by Christ, in the parable of the talents, which supersedes all further reasoning upon the subject. "Then he which had received one talent, came and said, Lord, I knew thee that thou art an austere man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed: and I was afraid, and hid thy talent in the earth; lo, there thou hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest, (or, knewest thou?) that I reap where I sowed not, and ga

by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth; and he that doubteth, is damned (condemned) if he eat, for whatsoever is not of faith (i. e. not done with a full persuasion of the lawfulness of it) is sin*.'

BOOK II.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

KEEP MY WORD? CONSIDERED.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word ? Because it is right, says one. Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things, says another.

ther where I have not strawed; thou oughtest THE QUESTION WHY AM I OBLIged to therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents; for unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have-Because it is conformable to reason and naabundance; but from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath: and cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth ||."

III. In every question of conduct, where one side is doubtful, and the other safe; we are bound to take the safe side.

This is best explained by an instance; and I know of none more to our purpose than that of suicide. Suppose, for example's sake, that it appeared doubtful to a reasoner upon the subject, whether he may lawfully destroy himself. He can have no doubt, that it is lawful for him to let it alone. Here therefore is a case, in which one side is doubtful, and the other side safe. By virtue therefore of our rule, he is bound to pursue the safe side, that is, to forbear from offering violence to himself, whilst a doubt remains upon his mind concerning the lawfulness of suicide.

It is prudent, you allow, to take the safe side. But our observation means something more. We assert that the action concerning

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ture, says a third. Because it is conformable to truth, says a fourth.--Because it promotes the public good, says a fifth.-Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a sixth. Upon which different accounts, two things are observable :

FIRST, that they all ultimately coincide.

The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness: the nature of things, means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions, for example, produce happiness, and others misery; reason is the principle by which we discover or judge of this constitution: truth is this judgment, expressed or drawn out into propositions. So that it necessarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public happiness, or happiness on the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth: and such (as will appear by and bye,) is the Divine character, that what promotes the general happiness, is required by the will of God; and what has all the above properties, must needs be right; for, right means no more than conformi ty to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be

Rom. xiv. 14, 22, 23.

And this is the reason that moralists, from a superior, there, I take it, we always reckon whatever different principles they set out, com- ourselves to be obliged. monly meet in their conclusions; that is, they enjoin the same conduct, prescribe the same rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cases the same determinations.

And from this account of obligation, it fol. lows, that we can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by: for nothing else can be a "violent motive" to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the' SECONDLY, it is to be observed, that these laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or puanswers all leave the matter short; for the in-nishments, pleasure, or pain, somehow or other, quirer may turn round upon his teacher with a depended upon our obedience; so neither should second question, in which he will expect to be we, without the same reason, be obliged to do satisfied, namely, Why am I obliged to do what what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the is right; to act agreeably to the fitness of things; commands of God. to conform to reason, nature, or truth; to promote the public good, or to obey the will of God?

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A MAN is said to be obliged, "when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another."

FIRST, "The motive must be violent." If a person, who has done me some little service, or has a small place in his disposal, ask me upon some occasion for my vote, I may possibly give it him, from a motive of gratitude or expectation: but I should hardly say that I was obliged to give it him; because the inducement does not rise high enough. Whereas, if a father or a master, any great benefactor, or one on whom my fortune depends, require my vote, I give it him of course: and my answer to all who asked me why I voted so and so, is, that my father or my master obliged me; that I had received so many favours from, or had so great a dependence upon, such a one, that I was obliged to vote as he directed me.

SECONDLY," It must result from the command of another." Offer a man a gratuity for doing any thing, for seizing, for example, an offender, he is not obliged by your offer to do it; nor would he say he is; though he may be induced, persuaded, prevailed upon, tempted. If a magistrate or the man's immediate superior command it, he considers himself as obliged to comply, though possibly he would lose less by a refusal in this case, than in the former.

I will not undertake to say that the words obligation and obliged are used uniformly in this sense, or always with this distinction: nor is it possible to tie down popular phrases to any constant signification: but wherever the motive is violent enough, and coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or the will of

CHAPTER III.

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD? RESUMED.

Let it be remembered, that to be obliged, is "to be urged by a violent motive, resulting from the command of another."

And then let it be asked, Why am I obliged to keep my word? and the answer will be, Because I am" urged to do so by a violent motive" (namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not,) " resulting from the command of another" (namely, of God.)

This solution goes to the bottom of the subject, as no further question can reasonably be asked.

Therefore, private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule.

When I first turned my thoughts to moral speculations, an air of mystery seemed to hang over the whole subject; which arose, I believe, from hence, that I supposed, with many authors whom I had read, that to be obliged to do a thing, was very different from being induced only to do it; and that the obligation to prac tise virtue, to do what is right, just, &c. was quite another thing, and of another kind, than the obligation which a soldier is under to obey his officer, a servant his master; or any of the civil and ordinary obligations of human life. Whereas, from what has been said, it appears that moral obligation is like all other obligations; and that obligation is nothing more than an inducement of sufficient strength, and resulting, in some way, from the command of another.

There is always understood to be a difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty. Thus, if I distrust a man who owed me ja sum of money, I should reckon it an act of prudence to get another person bound with him; but I should hardly call it an act of duty. On the other hand, it would be thought a very unusual and loose kind of language, to say, that as I bad made such a promise, it was prudent to perform it: or that, as my friend, when he went abroad, placed a box of jewels

in my hands, it would be prudent in me to preserve it for him till he returned.

Now, in what, you will ask, does the difference consist? inasmuch, as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one case and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act.

An ambassador, judging by what he knows of his sovereign's disposition, and arguing from what he has observed of his conduct, or is acquainted with of his designs, may take his measures in many cases with safety, and presume with great probability how his master would have him act on most occasions that arise: but if he have his commission and instructions in his pocket, it would be strange not to look into them. He will be directed by both rules: when his instructions are clear and positive, there is an end to all further deliberation (unless indeed he suspect their au.

The difference, and the only difference, is this; that, in the one case, we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come. They who would establish a system of mo-thenticity:) where his instructions are silent or rality, independent of a future state, must look out for some different idea of moral obligation; unless they can show that virtue conducts the possessor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater share of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.

To us there are two great questions: I. Will there be after this life any distribution of rewards and punishments at all?

II. If there be, what actions will be rewarded, and what will be punished?

dubious, he will endeavour to supply or explain them, by what he has been able to collect from other quarters of his master's general inclination or intentions.

Mr. Hume, in his fourth Appendix to his Principles of Morals, has been pleased to com. plain of the modern scheme of uniting Ethics with the Christian Theology. They who find themselves disposed to join in this complaint, will do well to observe what Mr. Hume himself has been able to make of morality without The first question comprises the credibility this union. And for that purpose, let them of the Christian Religion, together with the read the second part of the ninth section of presumptive proofs of a future retribution from the above Essay; which part contains the practhe light of nature. The second question com- tical application of the whole treatise,—a treaprises the province of morality. Both ques- tise which Mr. Hume declares to be "incom tions are too much for one work. The affir-parably the best he ever wrote." When they mative therefore of the first, although we confess that it is the foundation upon which the whole fabric rests, must in this treatise be taken for granted.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WILL OF GOD.

As the will of God is our rule; to inquire what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do, in any instance, is, in effect, to inquire what is the will of God in that instance ? which consequently becomes the whole business of morality.

Now there are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point:

I. By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture.

II. By what we can discover of his designs| and disposition from his works; or, as we usually call it, the light of nature.

And here we may observe the absurdity of separating natural and revealed religion from each other. The object of both is the same, to discover the will of God,-and, provided we do but discover it, it matters nothing by what means.

have read it over, let them consider, whether any motives there proposed are likely to be found sufficient to withhold men from the gra tification of lust, revenge, envy, ambition, avarice; or to prevent the existence of these passions. Unless they rise up from this celebrated essay, with stronger impressions upon their minds than it ever left upon mine, they will acknowledge the necessity of additional sanctions. But the necessity of these sanctions is not now the question. If they be in fact established, if the rewards and punishments held forth in the Gospel will actually come to pass, they must be considered. Such as reject the Christian Religion, are to make the best shift they can to build up a system, and lay the foundation of morality, without it. But it appears to me a great inconsistency in those who receive Christianity, and expect something to come of it, to endeavour to keep all such expectations out of sight in their reasonings concerning human duty.

The method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into "the tendency of the action to promote or diminish the general happiness." This rule proceeds upon the presumption, that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and, consequently, that those actions, which promote that will and wish, must be agreeable to him; and the contrary.

As this presumption is the foundation of our whole system, it becomes necessary to explain the reasons upon which it rests.

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