subject of panegyric and careless declamation, tical contentions; the preventing, by a known than of just reasoning or correct knowledge, rule of succession, of all competition for the su should be attended with uncertainty and con- preme power; and thereby repressing the hopes, fusion; or that it should be found impossible intrigues, and dangerous ambition of aspiring to contrive a definition, which may include the citizens. numerous, unsettled, and ever-varying significations, which the term is made to stand for, and at the same time accord with the condition and experience of social life.

Of the two ideas that have been stated of civil liberty, whichever we assume, and whatever reasoning we found upon them, concern-modation of the people, and a consequent deing its extent, nature, value, and preservation, this is the conclusion;-that that people, government, and constitution, is the freest, which makes the best provision for the enacting of expedient and salutary laws.

As a series of appeals must be finite, there necessarily exists in every government a pow-sensions in the ruling orders of the state, which, er from which the constitution has provided no appeal; and which power, for that reason, may be termed absolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbitrary, despotic; and is alike so in all countries.

A mixed government is composed by the combination of two or more of the simple forms of government above described:—and in whatever proportion each form enters into the constitution of a government, in the same proportion The separate advantages of MONARCHY are, may both the advantages and evils, which we unity of counsel, activity, decision, secrecy, | have attributed to that form, be expected: that despatch; the military strength and energy is, those are the uses to be maintained and culwhich result from these qualities of govern- tivated in each part of the constitution, and ment; the exclusion of popular and aristocra- these are the dangers to be provided against in

each. Thus, if secrecy and despatch be truly of being carried, unless an uniformity of coun. enumerated amongst the separate excellencies sels, a consistency of public measures and deof regal government, then a mixed govern- signs, be continued through a succession of ment, which retains monarchy in one part ages. This benefit may be expected with of its constitution, should be careful that greater probability where the supreme power the other estates of the empire do not, by descends in the same race, and where each an officious and inquisitive interference with prince succeeds, in some sort, to the aim, purthe executive functions, which are, or ought suits, and disposition of his ancestor, than if to be, reserved to the administration of the the crown, at every change, devolve upon a prince, interpose delays, or divulge what it is stranger, whose first care will commonly be to expedient to conceal. On the other hand, if pull down what his predecessor had built up; profusion, exaction, military domination, and and to substitute systems of administration, needless wars, be justly accounted natural pro- which must, in their turn, give way to the perties of monarchy, in its simple unqualified more favourite novelties of the next successor. form; then are these the objects to which, in a mixed government, the aristocratic and popular part of the constitution ought to direct their vigilance; the dangers against which they should raise and fortify their barriers; these are departments of sovereignty, over which a power of inspection and control ought to be deposited with the people.

ARISTOCRACIES are of two kinds. First, where the power of the nobility belongs to them in their collective capacity alone; that is, where, although the government reside in an assembly of the order, yet the members of that assembly separately and individually possess no authority or privilege beyond the rest of the community :-this describes the The same observation may be repeated of all constitution of Venice. Secondly, where the the other advantages and inconveniences which nobles are severally invested with great perhave been ascribed to the several simple forms sonal power and immunities, and where the of government; and affords a rule whereby to power of the senate is little more than the agdirect the construction, improvements, and ad-gregated power of the indivduals who compose ministration, of mixed governments-subject- it :—this is the constitution of Poland. Of ed however to this remark, that a quality sometimes results from the conjunction of two simple forms of government, which belongs not to the separate existence of either: thus corruption, which has no place in an absolute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is sure to gain admission into a constitution which divides the supreme power between an executive magistrate and a popular council.

these two forms of government, the first is more tolerable than the last; for, although the members of a senate should many, or even all of them, be profligate enough to abuse the au thority of their stations in the prosecution of private designs, yet, not being all under a temptation to the same injustice, not having all the same end to gain, it would still be difficult to obtain the consent of a majority to any speciAn hereditary MONARCHY is universally to fic act of oppression which the iniquity of an be preferred to an elective monarchy. The con- individual might prompt him to propose: or fession of every writer on the subject of civil if the will were the same, the power is more government, the experience of ages, the exam- confined; one tyrant, whether the tyranny reple of Poland, and of the papal dominions, seem side in a single person, or a senate, cannot exto place this amongst the few indubitable max-ercise oppression at so many places, at the same ims which the science of politics admits of. A time, as it may be carried on by the dominion crown is too splendid a prize to be conferred of a numerous nobility over their respective upon merit: the passions or interests of the vassals and dependants. Of all species of doelectors exclude all consideration of the quali-mination, this is the most odious: the freedom ties of the competitors. The same observation and satisfaction of private life are more conholds concerning the appointments to any of- strained and harassed by it than by the most fice which is attended with a great share of pow-vexatious law, or even by the lawless will of er or emolument. Nothing is gained by a popular choice, worth the dissensions, tumults, and interruption of regular industry, with which it is inseparably attended. Add to this, that a king, who owes his elevation to the event of a contest, or to any other cause than a fixed rule of succession, will be apt to regard one part of his subjects as the associates of his fortune, and the other as conquered foes. Nor should it be forgotten, amongst the advantages of an hereditary monarchy, that, as plans of national improvement and reform are seldom brought to maturity by the exertions of a single reign, a nation cannot attain to the degree of happiness and prosperity to which it is capable

an arbitrary monarch, from whose knowledge, and from whose injustice, the greatest part of his subjects are removed by their distance, or concealed by their obscurity.

Europe exhibits more than one modern example, where the people, aggrieved by the exactions, or provoked by the enormities, of their immediate superiors, have joined with the reigning prince in the overthrow of the aristocracy, deliberately exchanging their condition for the miseries of despotism. About the middle of the last century, the commons of Denmark, weary of the oppressions which they had long suffered from the nobles, and exasperated by some recent insults, presented

themselves at the foot of the throne with a for- tion of the human mind-political dignity and mal offer of their consent to establish unlimi-importance. ted dominion in the king. The revolution in II. Popular elections procure to the comSweden, still more lately brought about with mon people courtesy from their superiors. That the acquiescence, not to say the assistance, of contemptuous and overbearing insolence, with the people, owed its success to the same cause, which the lower orders of the community are namely, to the prospect of deliverance that it wont to be treated by the higher, is greatly afforded from the tyranny which their nobles mitigated where the people have something to exercised under the old constitution. In Eng-give. The assiduity with which their favour land, the people beheld the depression of the is sought upon these occasions, serves to gene. barons, under the house of Tudor, with satis-rate settled habits of condescension and res faction, although they saw the crown acquir-pect; and as human life is more embittered ing thereby a power which no limitations that by affronts than injuries, whatever contributes the constitution had then provided were like to procure mildness and civility of manners toly to confine. The lesson to be drawn from wards those who are most liable to suffer from such events, is this: that a mixed government, a contrary behaviour, corrects, with the pride, which admits a patrician order into its consti- in a great measure, the evil of inequality, and tution, ought to circumscribe the personal pri- deserves to be accounted among the most gevileges of the nobility, especially claims of he- nerous institutions of social life. reditary jurisdiction and local authority, with III. The satisfactions which the people in a jealousy equal to the solicitude with which it free governments derive from the knowledge wishes its own preservation: for nothing so and agitation of political subjects; such as the alienates the minds of the people from the go- proceedings and debates of the senate; the vernment under which they live, by a perpe-conduct and characters of ministers; the retual sense of annoyance and inconveniency, or volutions, intrigues, and contentions of parso prepares them for the practices of an enter-ties; and, in general, from the discussion of prising prince or a factious demagogue, as the public measures, questions, and occurrences. abuse which almost always accompanies the Subjects of this sort excite just enough of inexistence of separate immunities. terest and emotion to afford a moderate enAmongst the inferior, but by no means in-gagement to the thoughts, without rising to considerable advantages of a DEMOCRATIC con- any painful degree of anxiety, or ever leavstitution, or of a constitution in which the peo-ing a fixed operation upon the spirits ;—and ple partake of the power of legislation, the fol- what is this, but the end and aim of all those lowing should not be neglected:

amusements which compose so much of the I. The direction which it gives to the edu- business of life and of the value of riches? cation, studies, and pursuits, of the superior For my part (and I believe it to be the case orders of the community. The share which with most men who are arrived at the middle this has in forming the public manners and na- age, and occupy the middle classes of life,) tional character, is very important. In coun- had I all the money which I pay in taxes to tries, in which the gentry are excluded from government, at liberty to lay out upon amuseall concern in the government, scarcely any ment and diversion, I know not whether I thing is left which leads to advancement, but could make choice of any in which I could the profession of arms. They who do not ad- find greater pleasure than what I receive from dict themselves to this profession (and misera- expecting, hearing, and relating public news; ble must that country be, which constantly em- reading parliamentary debates and proceedploys the military service of a great proportionings; canvassing the political arguments, proof any order of its subjects!) are commonly jects, predictions, and intelligence, which are lost by the mere want of object and destin- conveyed by various channels, to every corner ation: that is, they either fall, without re- of the kingdom. These topics, exciting uniserve, into the more sottish habits of animal versal curiosity, and being such as almost gratification, or entirely devote themselves to every man is ready to form and prepared to the attainment of those futile arts and decora- deliver his opinion about, greatly promote, tions which compose the business and recom- and, I think, improve conversation. They mendations of a court: on the other hand, render it more rational and more innocent; where the whole, or any effective portion, of they supply a substitute for drinking, gaming, civil power is possessed by a popular assembly, scandal, and obscenity. Now the secrecy, the more serious pursuits will be encouraged; pu- jealousy, the solitude, and precipitation, of desrer morals, and in a more intellectual charac-potic governments, exclude all this. But the ter, will engage the public esteem; those fa. culties which qualify men for deliberation and debate, and which are the fruit of sober habits, of early and long-continued application, will be roused and animated by the reward which, of all others, most readily awakens the ambi

loss, you say, is trifling. I know that it is possible to render even the mention of it ridiculous, by representing it as the idle employment of the most insignificant part of the nation, the folly of village-statesmen and coffeehouse politicians: but I allow nothing to be a

K

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

trifle which ministers to the harmless gratifi- frauding the revenue of one province by smug-
cation of multitudes; nor any order of men to
be insignificant, whose number bears a respect-
able proportion to the sum of the whole com-
munity.

gling articles of taxation from the borders of an. other; and likewise so as to guard against undue partialities in the encouragement of trade. We have been accustomed to an opinion, that inconveniency, enlarge its dominions, by asTo what limits such a republic might, without a REPUBLICAN form of government suits only suming neighbouring provinces into the conwith the affairs of a small state: which opin- federation; or how far it is capable of uniting ion is founded in the consideration, that unless the liberty of a small commonwealth with the the people, in every district of the empire, be safety of a powerful empire; or whether, amadmitted to a share in the national represen- ongst co-ordinate powers, dissensions and jeatation, the government is not, as to them, a re-lousies would not be likely to arise, which, public; that elections, where the constituents for want of a common superior, might proceed are numerous, and dispersed through a wide ex- to fatal extremities; are questions upon which tent of country, are conducted with difficulty, the records of mankind do not authorise us to or rather, indeed, managed by the intrigues decide with tolerable certainty. The experi and combinations of a few, who are situated ment is about to be tried in America upon a near the place of election, each voter consider- large scale.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION.

ing his single suffrage as too minute a portion of the general interest to deserve his care or attendance, much less to be worth any opposition to influence and application; that whilst we contract the representation within a compass small enough to admit of orderly debate, the interest of the constituent becomes too small, of the representative too great. It is difficult also to maintain any connexion between them. meant so much of its law, as relates to the deBy the CONSTITUTION of a country, is He who represents two hundred thousand, is signation and form of the legislature; the necessarily a stranger to the greatest part of rights and functions of the several parts of the those who elect him: and when his interest legislative body; the construction, office, and amongst them ceases to depend upon an ac-jurisdiction, of courts of justice. The constiquaintance with their persons and character, tution is one principal division, section, or or a care or knowledge of their affairs; when title, of the code of public laws; distinguished such a representative finds the treasures and from the rest only by the superior importance honours of a great empire at the disposal of a of the subject of which it treats. few, and himself one of the few; there is little the terms constitutional and unconstitutional, reason to hope that he will not prefer to his mean legal and illegal. The distinction and Therefore public duty those temptations of personal ag- the ideas which these terms denote, are foundgrandisement which his situation offers, and ed in the same authority with the law of the which the price of his vote will always purchase. land upon any other subject; and to be ascerAll appeal to the people is precluded by the im-tained by the same inquiries. In England, possibility of collecting a sufficient proportion the system of public jurisprudence is made up of their force and numbers. The factions and of acts of parliament, of decisions of courts of the unanimity of the senate are equally dan- law, and of immemorial usages; consequentgerous. Add to these considerations, that in a ly, these are the principles of which the Engdemocratic constitution the mechanism is too lish constitution itself consists, the sources complicated, and the motions too slow, for the from which all our knowledge of its nature operations of a great empire; whose defence and and limitations is to be deduced, and the augovernment require execution and despatch, in thorities to which all appeal ought to be made, proportion to the magnitude, extent, and varie- and by which every constitutional doubt and ty, of its concerns. in these reasons; but much of the objection intelligible definition is the more necessary to There is weight, no doubt, question can alone be decided. This plain and seems to be done away by the contrivance of a be preserved in our thoughts, as some writers federal republic, which, distributing the coun- upon the subject absurdly confound what is try into districts of a commodious extent, and constitutional with what is expedient; proleaving to each district its internal legislation, nouncing forthwith a measure to be unconreserves to a convention of the states the ad-stitutional, which they adjudge in any respect justment of their relative claims; the levying, to be detrimental or dangerous: whilst others, direction, and government, of the common force again, ascribe a kind of transcendant authoriof the confederacy; the requisition of subsidies ty, or mysterious sanctity, to the constitution, for the support of this force; the making of peace as if it were founded in some higher original and war; the entering into treaties; the regu- than that which gives force and obligation to lation of foreign commerce; the equalization the ordinary laws and statutes of the realm, of duties upon imports, so as to prevent the de- or were inviolable on any other account than

its intrinsic utility. An act of parliament in to the amusement of the beholder, than the England can never be unconstitutional, in the accommodation of the inhabitant. strict and proper acceptation of the term; in In the British, and possibly in all other a lower sense it may, viz. when it militates constitutions, there exists a wide difference bewith the spirit, contradicts the analogy, or de-tween the actual state of the government and feats the provision, of other laws, made to re- the theory. The one results from the other; gulate the form of government. Even that but still they are different. When we conflagitious abuse of their trust, by which a par- template the theory of the British government, liament of Henry the Eighth conferred upon we see the king invested with the most absothe king's proclamation the authority of law, lute personal impunity; with a power of rewas unconstitutional only in this latter sense.jecting laws, which have been resolved upon Most of those who treat of the British con- by both houses of parliament; of conferring stitution, consider it as a scheme of govern- by his charter, upon any set or succession of ment formally planned and contrived by our men he pleases, the privilege of sending repreancestors, in some certain era of our national sentatives into one house of parliament, as by history, and as set up in pursuance of such re-his immediate appointment he can place whom gular plan and design. Something of this sort he will in the other. What is this, a foreigner is secretly supposed, or referred to, in the ex- might ask, but a more circuitous despotism? pressions of those who speak of the "princi-Yet, when we turn our attention from the leples of the constitution," of bringing back the gal extent, to the actual exercise of royal auconstitution to its "first principles," of re- thority in England, we see these formidable storing it to its "original purity," or "pri- prerogatives dwindled into mere ceremonies, mitive model." Now this appears to me an and, in their stead, a sure and commanding erroneous conception of the subject. No such influence, of which the constitution, it seems, plan was ever formed, consequently no such is totally ignorant, growing out of that enor first principles, original model, or standard, mous patronage which the increased territory exist: I mean, there never was a date or point and opulence of the empire have placed in the of time in our history, when the government disposal of the executive magistrate. of England was to be set up anew, and when Upon questions of reform, the habit of reit was referred to any single person, or assem-flection to be encouraged, is a sober comparibly, or committee, to frame a charter for the son of the constitution under which we live,future government of the country; or when not with models of speculative perfection, but a constitution so prepared and digested, was with the actual chance of obtaining a better. by common consent received and established. This turn of thought will generate a politiIn the time of the civil wars, or rather between cal disposition, equally removed from that puthe death of Charles the First and the restora- erile admiration of present establishments, tion of his son, many such projects were pub-which sees no fault, and can endure no change; lished, but none were carried into execution. Jand that distempered sensibility, which is alive The Great Charter, and the Bill of Rights, were wise and strenuous efforts to obtain security against certain abuses of regal power, by which the subject had been formerly aggrieved: but these were, either of them, much too partial modifications of the constitution, to give it a new original. The constitution of England, like that of most countries of Europe, hath grown out of occasion and emergency; from the fluctuating policy of different ages; from the contentions, successes, interests, and opportunities, of different orders and parties of men in the community. It resembles one of those old mansions, which, instead of being built all at once, after a regular plan, and ac-diate successor, applied themselves to the encording to the rules of architecture at present couragement and regulation of trade by many established, has been reared in different ages wise laws, they knew not, that, together with of the art, has been altered from time to time, wealth and industry, they were diffusing a and has been continually receiving additions consciousness of strength and independency, and repairs suited to the taste, fortune, or con- which would not long endure, under the forms veniency, of its successive proprietors. In of a mixed government, the dominion of arbisuch a building, we look in vain for the ele- trary princes. When it was debated whether gance and proportion, for the just order and the mutiny act, the law by which the army is correspondence of parts, which we expect in a governed and maintained, should be temporary modern edifice; and which external symme- or perpetual, little else probably occurred to try, after all, contributes much more perhaps the advocates of an annual bill, than the ex

only to perceptions of inconveniency, and is too impatient to be delivered from the uneasiness which it feels, to compute either the peril or expense of the remedy. Political innovations commonly produce many effects beside those that are intended. The direct consequence is often the least important. Incidental, remote, and unthought-of evil or advantages, frequently exceed the good that is designed, or the mischief that is foreseen. It is from the silent and unobserved operation, from the obscure progress of causes set at work for differ. ent purposes, that the greatest revolutions take their rise. When Elizabeth, and her imme