ANNOTATION.

'A system of strict optimism may be the real system.' The one great difficulty, which is continually meeting us in various shapes, and of which the one now before us is a portion,— the existence of evil,-is one of which no satisfactory explanation has ever been offered, or, we may be assured, ever will be, to Man in his present state. Many well-meaning but not clearheaded persons, zealous to vindicate the ways of God to Man,' have written on the subject, weakly indeed and ineffectually, but in a pious and reverend tone. But some, while pretending to pre-eminent piety and humility, and denouncing as ungodly, or deriding as childish, all who differ from them, have used language which is in fact profanely presumptuous. It is to be hoped that some of them have spoken as they do, through mere confusion of thought, not perceiving what their doctrine really amounts to. A right-minded Christian however will say, 'I am sure so and so is right, though I do not understand why or how it is; but such is the command of my heavenly Father ; and I do understand that I have good grounds for trusting in Him.' And such a man will keep clear of the presumption, calling itself humility, of those who insist on it that in such and such instances the Almighty had no reason at all for what He has done, except (as they express it) to 'declare his sovereignty; and that He acted only for his own glory;' as if He could literally seek glory! Whenever the Most High has merely revealed to us his will, we must not dare to pronounce that He had no reason for it except his will, because He has not thought fit to make those reasons known to us. To say (as some have presumed to say) that He does' so and so for

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1 'Multi quidem, ac si invidiam a Deo repellere vellent, electionem ita fatentur ut negent quenquam reprobari. Sed inscitè nimis et pueriliter, quando ipsa electio nisi reprobationi opposita non staret.. Dicitur segregare Deus quos adoptat in salutem. . . Quos ergo Deus præterit, reprobat: neque aliâ de causâ nisi quod ab hereditate quam filiis suis prædestinat, illos vult excludere.'-Inst. lib. iii. cap. xxiii. § 1. . . . . ‘Unde factum est, ut tot gentes, una cum liberis eorum infantibus, æternæ morti involveret lapsus Adæ absque remedio, nisi quia Deo ita visum est ? Hic obmutescere oportet tam dicaces alioqui linguas. Decretum quidem horribile fateor inficiari tamen nemo poterit quin præsciverit Deus quem exitum esset habiturus homo, antequam ipsum conderet, et ideo præsciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinarat.'-Calvin Instit. lib. iii. cap. xxiii. § 7. How far from having attained to this doctrine, or forming any notion of it, must have been those disciples who were present when our Lord beheld the City and WEPT OVER IT!'

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no cause whatever except that He chuses it, seems little, if at all, short of blasphemy. Even an earthly king, being not responsible to any of his subjects for the reasons of his commands, may sometimes think fit to issue commands without explaining his reasons. And it would be insolent rashness for any one thence to conclude that he had no reasons, but acted from mere caprice.

So also, a dutiful child will often have to say, 'I do so and so because my kind and wise parents have commanded me: that is reason enough for me.' But though this is-to the child—a very good reason for obeying the command, it would be a very bad reason, with the parents, for giving that command. And he would show his filial veneration, and trust, not by taking for granted that his parents had no reason for their commands, but, on the contrary, by taking for granted that there was a good reason both for their acting as they did, and for their withholding from him any explanation.

Most wise is Scaliger's precept :

Nescire velle quæ Magister optimus

Docere non vult, eruditu inscitia est.

THAT

CHAPTER VII.

The supposed Effects of Christianity.

'HAT a religion, which, under every form in which it is taught, holds forth the final reward of virtue, and punishment of vice, and proposes those distinctions of virtue and vice, which the wisest and most cultivated part of mankind confess to be just, should not be believed, is very possible; but that, so far as it is believed, it should not produce any good, but rather a bad effect upon public happiness, is a proposition, which it requires very strong evidence to render credible. Yet many have been found to contend for this paradox, and very confident appeals have been made to history, and to observation, for the truth of it.

In the conclusions, however, which these writers draw, from what they call experience, two sources, I think, of mistake, may be perceived.

One is, that they look for the influence of religion in the wrong place.

The other, that they charge Christianity with many consequences, for which it is not responsible.

1. The influence of religion is not to be sought for in the councils of princes, in the debates or resolutions of popular assemblies, in the conduct of governments towards their subjects, or of states and sovereigns towards one another; of conquerors at the head of their armies, or of parties intriguing for power at home (topics which alone almost occupy the attention, and fill the pages of history); but must be perceived, if perceived at all, in the silent course of private and domestic life. Nay more; even there its influence may not be very obvious to observation. If it check, in some degree, personal dissoluteness, if it beget a general probity in the transaction of business, if it produce soft and humane manners in the mass of the community, and occasional exertions of laborious or expensive benevolence in a few individuals, it is all the effect which can offer itself to external notice. The kingdom of heaven is within us. That which is the substance of the religion, its hopes and consolations, its intermixture with the thoughts by day and by night, the devotion of the heart, the control of appetite, the steady direction of the will to the commands of God, is necessarily invisible. Yet upon these depend the virtue and the happiness of millions. This cause renders the representations of history, with respect to religion, defective and fallacious, in a greater degree than they are upon any other subject. Religion operates most upon those of whom history knows the least; upon fathers and mothers in their families, upon men servants and maid servants, upon the orderly tradesman, the quiet villager, the manufacturer at his loom, the husbandman in his fields. Amongst such its influence collectively may be of inestimable value, yet its effects in the mean time little, upon those who figure upon the stage of the world. They may know nothing of it; they may believe nothing of it they may be actuated by motives more impetuous than those which religion is able to excite. It cannot, therefore, be thought strange, that this influence should elude the grasp and touch of public history; for what is public history, but a register of the successes and disappointments, the vices, the follies, and the quarrels, of those who engage in contentions for power?

I will add, that much of this influence may be felt in times of public distress, and little of it in times of public wealth and security. This also increases the uncertainty of any opinions that we draw from historical representations. The influence of Christianity is commensurate with no effects which history states. We do not pretend that it has any such necessary and irresistible power over the affairs of nations, as to surmount the force of other causes.

The christian religion also acts upon public usages and institutions, by an operation which is only secondary and indirect. Christianity is not a code of civil law. It can only reach public institutions through private character. Now its influence upon private character may be considerable, yet many public usages and institutions, repugnant to its principles, may remain. To get rid of these, the reigning part of the community must act, and act together. But it may be long before the persons who compose this body, be sufficiently touched with the christian character, to join in the suppression of practices, to which they and the public have been reconciled, by causes which will reconcile the human mind to anything, by habit and interest. Nevertheless, the effects of Christianity, even in this view, have been important. It has mitigated the conduct of war, and the treatment of captives. It has softened the administration of despotic, or of nominally despotic governments. It has abolished polygamy. It has restrained the licentiousness of divorces. It has put an end to the exposure of children, and the immolation of slaves. It has suppressed the combats of gladiators,' and the impurities of religious rites. It has banished, if not unnatural vices, at least the toleration of them. It has greatly meliorated the condition of the laborious part, that is to say, of the mass of every community, by procuring for them a day of weekly rest. In all countries, in which it is professed, it has produced numerous establishments for the relief of sickness and poverty; and, in some, a regular and general provision by law. It has triumphed over the slavery established in the Roman empire:

1 Lipsius affirms, (Sat. bk. i. c. 12) that the gladiatorial shows sometimes cost Europe twenty or thirty thousand lives in a month; and that not only the men but even the women of all ranks were passionately fond of these shows. See Bishop Porteus's Sermon XIII.

it is contending, and, I trust, will one day prevail, against the worse slavery of the West Indies.

A christian writer,' so early as in the second century, has testified the resistance which Christianity made to wicked and licentious practices, though established by law and by public usage. 'Neither in Parthia, do the Christians, though Parthians, use polygamy; nor in Persia, though Persians, do they marry their own daughters; nor, among the Bactri, or Galli, do they violate the sanctity of marriage; nor, wherever they are, do they suffer themselves to be overcome by ill-constituted laws and manners.'

Socrates did not destroy the idolatry of Athens, or produce the slightest revolution in the manners of his country. But the argument to which I recur, is, that the benefit of religion being felt chiefly in the obscurity of private stations, necessarily escapes the observation of history. From the first general notification of Christianity to the present day, there have been in every age many millions, whose names were never heard of, made better by it, not only in their conduct, but in their disposition; and happier, not so much in their external circumstances, as in that which is inter præcordia, in that which alone deserves the name of happiness, the tranquillity and consolation of their thoughts. It has been, since its commencement, the author of happiness and virtue to millions and millions of the human race. Who is there that would not wish his son to be a Christian?

Christianity also, in every country in which it is professed, hath obtained a sensible, although not a complete influence, upon the public judgment of morals. And this is very important. For without the occasional correction which public. opinion receives, by referring to some fixed standard of morality, no man can foretell into what extravagances it might wander. Assassination might become as honourable as duelling; unnatural crimes be accounted as venial, as fornication is wont to be accounted. In this way it is possible, that many may be kept in order by Christianity, who are not themselves Christians. They may be guided by the rectitude which it communicates to public opinion. Their consciences may suggest

1 Bardesanes ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. vi. 10.