although this be the experience, and the contrariety, which Archbishop Tillotson alleged in the quotation with which Mr. Hume opens his essay, it is certainly not that experience, nor that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And, short of this, I know no intelligible signification which can be affixed to the term 'contrary to experience,' but one, viz., that of not having ourselves experienced anything similar to the thing related, or, such things not being generally experienced by others. I say 'not generally;' for to state concerning the fact in question, that no such thing was ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to assume the subject of the controversy.

Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the probability there is, that, if the thing were true, we should experience things similar to it, or that such things would be generally experienced. Suppose it then to be true that miracles were wrought upon the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could decide its authority, is it certain that such miracles would be repeated so often, and in so many places, as to become objects of general experience? Is it a probability approaching to certainty? Is it a probability of any great strength or force? Is it such as no evidence can encounter? And yet this probability is the exact converse, and therefore the exact measure of the improbability which arises from the want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human testimony.

It is not like alleging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in natural philosophy; because, when these are related, it is expected that, under the same circumstances, the same effect will follow universally; and in proportion as this expec-. tation is justly entertained, the want of a corresponding experience negatives the history. But to expect concerning a miracle that it should succeed upon repetition, is to expect that which would make it cease to be a miracle, which is contrary to its nature as such, and would totally destroy the use and purpose for which it was wrought.

The force of experience as an objection to miracles is founded in the presumption, either that the course of nature is invariable, or that, if it be ever varied, variations will be frequent

and general. Has the necessity of this alternative been demonstrated? Permit us to call the course of nature the agency of an intelligent Being, and is there any good reason for judging this state of the case to be probable? Ought we not rather to expect, that such a Being, upon occasions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which He had appointed, yet, that such occasions should return seldom; that these interruptions consequently should be confined to the experience of a few; that the want of it, therefore, in many, should be matter neither of surprise nor objection?

But as a continuation of the argument from experience it is said, that, when we advance accounts of miracles, we assign effects without causes, or we attribute effects to causes inadequate to the purpose, or to causes of the operation of which we have no experience. Of what causes, we may ask, and of what effects does the objection speak? If it be answered that, when we ascribe the cure of the palsy to a touch, of blindness to the anointing of the eyes with clay, or the raising of the dead to a word, we lay ourselves open to this imputation; we reply, that we ascribe no such effects to such causes. We perceive no virtue or energy in these things more than in other things of the same kind. They are merely signs to connect the miracle with its end. The effect we ascribe simply to the volition of the Deity; of whose existence and power, not to say of whose presence and agency, we have previous and independent proof. We have therefore all we seek for in the works of rational agents, a sufficient power and an adequate motive. In a word, once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not incredible.

Mr. Hume states the case of miracles to be a contest of opposite improbabilities, that is to say, a question whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false; and this I think a fair account of the controversy. But herein I remark a want of argumentative justice, that, in describing the improbability of miracles, he suppresses all those circumstances of extenuation, which result from our knowledge of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity, his concern in the creation, the end answered by the miracle, the importance of that end, and its subserviency to the plan pursued in the work of nature. As Mr. Hume has represented the ques

tion, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such Being exists in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to have been wrought upon occasions the most deserving, and for purposes the most beneficial, or for no assignable end whatever, or for an end confessedly trifling or pernicious. This surely cannot be a correct statement. In adjusting also the other side of the balance, the strength and weight of testimony, this author has provided an answer to every possible accumulation of historical proof, by telling us, that we are not obliged to explain how the story or the evidence arose. Now I think that we are obliged; not, perhaps, to show by positive accounts how it did, but by a probable hypothesis how it might so happen. The existence of the testimony is a phenomenon. The truth of the fact solves the phenomenon. If we reject this solution, we ought to have some other to rest in; and none even by our adversaries can be admitted, which is not consistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human conduct at present, or which makes men then to have been a different kind of Beings from what they are now.

But the short consideration which, independently of every other, convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple case; and, if it produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in the demonstration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called Mr. Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible that they should be deceived; if the governor of the country, hearing a rumour of this account, should call these men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed; if I myself saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or

strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account; still, if Mr. Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now, I undertake to say that there exists not a sceptic in the world who would not believe them; or who would defend such incredulity.

Instances of spurious miracles supported by strong apparent testimony undoubtedly demand examination. Mr. Hume has endeavoured to fortify his argument by some examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to show that none of them reach the strength or circumstances of the christian evidence. In these, however, consists the weight of his objection. In the principle itself I am persuaded there is none.

ANNOTATIONS.

'Mankind stood in need of a revelation.'

These words would admit of being so understood as to be open to the reply, 'Why then was it not bestowed on all mankind?' But the Author shortly after explains his meaning to be merely-whatmust surely be admitted as nothing unreasonable 'only that in miracles adduced in support of revelation, there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount.'

I have endeavoured to show, in a subsequent part of this volume, that we have good reason for regarding every individual civilized man,—whether Christian, Deist, or Atheist, as himself a portion of a standing monument of what may be fairly called revelation' to mankind.

a

'In what way can a revelation be made, but by miracles?"

It is important to keep in mind that a Miracle in the etymological sense-i.e. a mere wonder-proves nothing. It is a proof, only when it is (as it is commonly called in our Scriptures) a Sign. When any one performs something beyond human power, or foretells something undiscoverable by human sagacity, appealing to this as a sign that he is the bearer of a divine message, it is then, and then only, that this becomes miraculous evidence.

E.C.

But the practice which is but too prevalent is much to be deprecated, of applying the words 'miraculous' or 'providential' to any unusual occurrence; as if the divine providence had nothing to do with ordinary events. A great advantage is given to anti-Christians by this rash and irreverent language coming from advocates who professing pre-eminent piety, are, in reality, guilty of presumptuous impiety, in proclaiming (virtually) that thus saith the Lord; when the Lord hath not spoken.'

A clergyman having pointed out (in conformity with our Lord's declaration, Luke xiii.) that we are not warranted, in the absence of a distinct revelation to that effect, to speak of the late famine as a special judgment from Heaven on the sufferers, and a sign of divine wrath against the nation for extending toleration to Roman-catholics, was, for this, denounced, publicly, in print, by a brother clergyman, as denying all revelation!

Well may our Religion say, 'Save me from my friends, and I fear not my enemies!'

"The force of Experience, as an objection to miracles, is founded on the presumption, either that the course of Nature is invariable,' &c.

There is a passage in the Quarterly Review (Oct. 1859) which is so much to the purpose that I have taken the liberty of extracting a portion of the substance of it.

'It would perhaps have been more clear, if the defenders of the christian miracles had used the expression of 'the nowexisting course of Nature,' or, the ordinary course of things as now observed by us.' For, if by 'the course of Nature' be understood, that which is conformable to the divine appointment, then, to speak of anything occurring that is preternatural, would be a contradiction.

'Some persons however who admit the possible, and the actual occurrence of miracles, are accustomed to speak as if they thought (though perhaps that is not really their meaning) that the Course of Nature' is something that goes on of itself; but that God has the power, which He sometimes exercises, of interrupting it; even as a man who has constructed some such