Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic AutonomyThe laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. States, they argue that particular institutional forms--such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature--have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process. |
Contents
LAWS BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION | 1 |
RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS | 17 |
STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING | 44 |
A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION DISCRETION AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS | 78 |
LEGISLATION AGENCY POLICYMAKING AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN | 109 |
THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS | 139 |
THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS | 171 |
LAWS INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES | 210 |
MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3 | 231 |
POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3 | 233 |
PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3 | 238 |
THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION | 242 |
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administrative adopt agency argue argument behavior bicameral bill bureaucrats cabinet ministers chambers Chapter coalition coded common law Compensation compliance boundary Congress constrain Corporatism corporatist costs countries create delegation democracies Democrats dependent variable design of legislation detailed legislation detailed statutes discuss divided government Divided Legislature dummy variable effect empirical enrollment example executive exist HMOs ideal point incentives increases influence interacted issue legislative capacity legislative majorities legislative statutes legislative veto low-discretion law low-discretion statute measure Medicaid ment Michigan minority government MMC program nonstatutory factors number of words optimal parliamentary democracies Parliamentary model parliamentary systems party policy categories policy conflict policy details policy implementation policy instructions policy language policy outcomes policymaking process political control political systems politicians presidential systems Republicans role scholars separation of powers sexual harassment specific policy tests text blocks theory tion types U.S. Congress Unified Legislature Veto model write detailed