treacherous: his words are enticing, but in-. fuse a flow and a fecret poifon, which faps the moral constitution, and vitiates the foul. Scepticifm is fond of admiration, and no zealot is more earnest to make profelytes than the Deift: he must be gratified with his circle of hearers and admirers. The Infidel never retires to the defert for filent meditation: he muft find his converts in fociety; that fociety which he disturbs by a cruel and mifchievous zeal, and whofe confidence he has fhaken by delufive doubts. The preacher of irreligion endeavours to fascinate by impofing pretences: he even affects a zeal for the fervice of mankind, and for the advancement of good morals: he affumes the character of virtue: he is clothed in humility: His words are finoother than oil, yet be they very fwords; the poifon of afps is under his lips: he talks of the beauty of that virtue which he does not practice he disguises vice under the fpecious garb of fome excellence, with a pomp of words his boaft is of human reafon and of human fufficiency, while he is the dupe and the flave of his paffions; and his life, ever at variance with his profeffions, proves the fallibility of his fyftem.

Romans, c. iii. v. 13.

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But though the pretences of Deifts, both ancient and modern, may in some respects differ, their object is the fame. They affect the title of philofophers, while it is their оссираtion to diffuade us from wifdom; not to dif cover truth, but to diftort it. They have been embodied under various leaders; but the champions are all subtle, active, and bold. They perfevere with conftancy worthy of a better caufe. They mingle reputation with impiety, and fyftematically direct their aim against the Rock of Ages. But the fame ambition, which induces them to reject revelation, infpires each with the defire of being the author of a system; and, whilst they are at variance with each other, for their principles are inconfiftent, they are only agreed in enmity against the Gofpel. But, to repeat what has been before obferved, let not modern unbelievers flatter themselves with the idea that their sentiments are novel all they advance, if it have any variety, is merely a modification of the leading principles of the fchools of antiquity. Thus the eternity of matter; the fortuitous concurrence of atoms; the irrefiftible influence of fate; philofophical neceflity; objections to a divine Providence from apparent imperfection in his works and moral government; doubts

of a future existence; all these various queftions were agitated by ancient philofophers. That matter proceeded from the substance of a felf-existent Deity, and that after a period all things would again be absorbed in him; that he would then exift alone; that after another period other beings would be again produced from him, and that these fucceffive revolutions would be perpetual, was and is ftill the prevailing doctrine of the Eaft. The Stoics adopted this opinion as well as the Gnoftics, who perplexed the first preachers of the Gospel. Ariftotle, though a naturalist, if he did not expressly deny the being of God, yet fuppofed the universe to have exifted from all eternity, independent of his contrivance or wisdom. Epicurus, as he made his motive atoms the original cause of all created things, conjectured that they would again be refolved into their first principles. His doctrines indeed have been the favourite tenets of the greater part of subLequent philofophers. Whether fincerely or not, he admitted that there were Gods; and that there is a God modern fceptics admit. He probably was influenced to this confeffion by the fear of public cenfure. It is to be fuppofed that fubfequent fceptics have been under a fimilar impreffion; and, to render their

opinions more palatable, grant what they doubt. Yet, while he confeffed the existence of popular Gods, he denied that they cared for human affairs. And is not this the argument of those who deny a particular Providence? He talked of the beauty of virtue, but removed all the incentives which alone could give it intereft or vigour. Such too are the opinions of those sceptical multitudes, who with a perverse and infatuated ingratitude appear to disdain the offers of Heaven; who wish to owe eternal as well as temporal felicity to any cause, rather than to the bounty of their Creator. They will neither be happy in the manner which infinite wifdom condefcends to propose, nor submit their understandings to God himself. They attribute excellence to any cause rather than to him. They attribute the effect of creative power rather to the efforts of nature, than to the intentions of the Deity. They grant prefcience and contrivance to inactive matter, rather than to the agency: of God; and, instead of being awakened by the proofs of his wisdom and goodness to fentiments of love and admiration, they receive all this intimation with coldness, if not with abhorrence. Of the origin of evil, the most abfurd ideas have been entertained by the Ori

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ental Philofophers; and yet, however abfurd, they form the grounds of all objections which are still made against a particular Providence. Our bleffed Lord had himself to contend with the Sadducees, who, following the doctrines of their founder Sadoc, maintained the fyftem of materialism, and denied a refurrection or future ftate, inferring that there was neither angel or spirit. On the whole, we can trace every modern dogma to fome ancient fource. How humiliating muft it then be to the freethinker, to learn, that he cannot arrogate to himself the praife of novelty, which is his chief inducement for objecting to revelation; that his favourite pofitions have been anticipated, and are at the fame time as deftitute of originality, as they are void of folid conviction !

The miracles of our bleffed Mafter could not be denied by those who saw them; but, agreeably to the prejudices of the times, they were afcribed to the cooperation of evil demons. Imposture was not imputed to thefe effects of divine power. The proofs were too decifive and public. Such impiety was reserved for subsequent ages, who could fuggeft it with lefs danger of confutation. What then is there of variety, what of confiftency, for prefent