of whose judgment, as I had a high and just esteem, I was desirous to have his opinion of my piece, in respect both of argument and of composition, before I should venture to lay it before the public. This gentleman, in return, after giving his opinion in a candid and friendly manner, added, that as he knew I was myself a little acquainted with Mr Hume, there would be at least no impropriety, if I consented, in his showing him the manuscript. To this I heartily agreed; and did it the more readily, as I thought it very possible that, in some things, I might have mistaken that author's meaning; in which case, he was surely better qualified than any other person to set me right. That, however, had not been the case; for though Mr Hume remarks very freely on my examination of his Essay, he does not, in a single instance, charge me with either misunderstanding or misrepresenting him. In returning the manuscript, Mr Hume accompanied it with a letter to my friend, containing such observations as had occurred to him in the perusal. This letter, with the writer's permission, was transmitted to me. It is to it he alludes in the second sentence of that which he afterwards wrote to me, and which is inserted above.

It cannot be denied, that, in the first letter, he appeared not a little hurt, by the freedom of the manner in which his principles and reasoning had been canvassed. To complaints of this kind a few hints are subjoined, as suggesting topics from which a sufficient answer might be drawn to some of my refutations and objections. In regard to a few particular expressions complained of, I have, as he justly observes, either removed or softened them, that I might, as much as possible, avoid the offence without impairing the argument. For the hints he has thrown out, by way of reply, I consider myself as indebted to him. They have suggested objections which had not occurred to me, and which required to be obviated, that the argument might have all the weight and all the illustration of which it is capable. I did accordingly, where it appeared requisite, introduce, and, in my judgment, refute the suggested answer. Thus I was enabled to anticipate objections and remove difficulties which might have occurred to other readers, and been thought by some very momentous. But as the manuscript had, before then, been put into the hands of the printer at Edinburgh, I could not, at Aberdeen, avail myself of those hints so easily, as by making them the subject of notes which I could soon transmit to the printer, with directions in regard to the passages to which they refer. I was not a little surprised, that I could find nothing in reply to my refutation of his abstract and metaphysical argument on the evidence of testimony, displayed with so much ostentation in the first part of his Essay, the production of which argument, to the public, seems to have been his principal motive for writing on the subject. All his observations of any moment were levelled against the answers which had been given to his more familiar and popular topics, employed in the second part. The letter, which is addressed to Dr Hugh Blair, Edinburgh, is as follows:

"SIR,I have perused the ingenious performance which you was so obliging as to put into my hands, with all the attention possible, though not perhaps with all the seriousness and gravity which you have so frequently recommended to me. But the fault lies not in the piece, which is certainly very acute, but in the subject. I know you will say it lies in neither, but in myself alone. If that be so, I am sorry to say that I believe it is incurable.

"I could wish that your friend had not chosen to appear as a controversial writer, but had endeavoured to establish his principles, in general, without any reference to a particular book or person; though I own he does me a great deal of honour in thinking that any thing I have wrote deserves his attention: For, besides many inconveniences which attend that kind of writing, I see it is almost impossible to preserve decency and good manners in it. This author, for instance, says sometimes obliging things of me, much beyond what I can presume to deserve; and I thence conclude, that in general he did not mean to insult me: yet I meet with some other passages more worthy of Warburton and his followers than of so ingenious an author.

"But as I am not apt to lose my temper, and would still less incline to do so with a friend of yours, I shall calmly communi

cate to you some remarks on the argument, since you seem to desire it. I shall employ very few words, since a hint will suffice to a gentleman of this author's penetration.

"Sect. 1. I would desire the author to consider, whether the medium by which we reason concerning human testimony be different from that which leads us to draw any inferences concerning other human actions, that is, our knowledge of human nature from experience? Or, why it is different? I suppose we conclude an honest man will not lie to us, in the same manner as we conclude that he will not cheat us. As to the youthful propensity to believe, which is corrected by experience, it seems obvious, that children adopt, blindfold, all the opinions, principles, sentiments, and passions, of their elders, as well as credit their testimony; nor is this more strange than that a hammer should make an impression on clay.

own.

"Sect. 2. No man can have any other experience but his The experience of others becomes his only by the credit which he gives to their testimony, which proceeds from his own experience of human nature.

"Sect. 3. There is no contradiction in saying, that all the testimony which ever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision; and yet forming a fiction or supposition of a testimony for a particular miracle, which might not only merit attention, but amount to a full proof of it, for instance, the absence of the sun during forty-eight hours. But reasonable men would only conclude from this fact, that the machine of the globe was disordered during the time.

Page 28. I find no difficulty to explain my meaning, and yet shall not probably do it in any future edition. The proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that species or kind of proof which is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt, as is the case with all probabilities; but there are degrees of this species, and when a weaker proof is opposed to a stronger, it is overcome.

"Page 29. There is very little more delicacy in telling a man he speaks nonsense by implication than in saying so directly

"Sect. 4. Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of witches, or hobgoblins, or fairies, and canvass particularly the evidence? I never knew any one that examined and deliberated about nonsense who did not believe it before the end of his inquiries.

"Sect. 5. I wonder the author does not perceive the reason why Mr John Knox and Mr Alexander Henderson did not work as many miracles as their brethren in other churches. Miracle-working was a popish trick, and discarded with the other parts of that religion. Men must have new and opposite | ways of establishing new and opposite follies.* The same reason extends to Mahomet. The Greek priests, who were in the neighbourhood of Arabia, and many of them in it, were as great miracle-workers as the Romish; and Mahomet would have been laughed at for so stale and simple a device. To cast out devils, and cure the blind, where every one almost can do as much, is not the way to get any extraordinary ascendant over men. I never read of a miracle in my life that was not meant to establish some new point of religion. There are no miracles wrought in Spain to prove the gospel; but Saint Francis Xavier wrought a thousand well attested ones for that purpose in the Indies. The miracles in Spain, which are also fully and completely attested, are wrought to prove the efficacy of a particular crucifix or relic, which is always a new point, or, at least, not universally received. ±

* On the observation, that none of the Reformers, either abroad or at home, had ever pretended to the power of working miracles, notwithstanding the enthusiasm with which the Essayist charges them in his History, and notwithstanding the great facility which he affirms there is in this way of imposing upon mankind, to this he replies as above, "I wonder the author does not perceive," &c. My return to this will be found in a note in the Dissertation.

The reply to the observation with regard to Mahomet, will be found in the place referred to, partly in the text, and partly in the note at the bottom of the page.

In the former edition, I had asserted, that the oracular predictions among the Pagans, and the pretended wonders performed by Capuchins and Friars, by itinerant or stationary teachers among the Roman Catholics, could not be denominated miracles ascribed to a new system of religion. This remark drew from Mr Hume the reply as above, "I never read," &c. To this objection the note on that passage is intended as an answer; whether it be a sufficient one the reader will

"Sect. 6. If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines.

"I could wish your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which seem to him to have that tendency; while I have wrote so many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at least, are entirely inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard because he has been seen fuddled once in his lifetime?

"Having said so much to your friend, who is certainly a very ingenious man, though a little too zealous for a philosopher; permit me also the freedom of saying a word to yourself. Whenever I have had the pleasure to be in your company, if the discourse turned upon any common subject of literature or reasoning, I always parted from you both entertained and instructed. But when the conversation was diverted by you from this channel towards the subject of your profession, though I doubt not but your intentions were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the same satisfaction-I was apt to be tired, and you to be angry. I would therefore wish for the future, wherever my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics should be forborne between us. I have, long since, done with all inquiries on such subjects, and am become incapable of instruction, though I own no one is more capable of conveying it than yourself.

After having given you the liberty of communicating to your friend what part of this letter you think proper, I remain,

SIR,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

DAVID HUME."

It may not be improper, in order as much as possible to prevent misapprehension, to add, that though I know that judge. In any event, he will, I persuade myself, do me the justice to own, that I have not weakened my adversary's plea by my manner of stating it. To avoid this, I have kept as close to the objector's own words as I could properly, without naming and quoting him. Beside these observations, I hardly find any thing in the letter, having the appearance of argument, which affects my reasoning.

several pieces on the same subject have been published since the first edition of my Dissertation, I have not had the good fortune to see any of them, except one printed along with other tracts by the late learned and accurate Dr Price. There is one in particular by Dr Farmer, which I have oftener than once inquired about, but have not yet been lucky enough to meet with. This, perhaps, is imputable to the lateness of my inquiries; for I acknowledge that I was so much engrossed by other studies at the time of its first appearing, that I did not think of reading more on that article, till an application to myself, for a new edition of the Dissertation, suggested the propriety of consulting what may have been written by learned men on the subject posterior to the first edition. From some other works I have read of Dr Farmer's, I have reason to believe that the piece alluded to is both ingenious and acute; and from some account of it, which I remember to have perused in a Review, I have ground to suspect that his principles and mine on that subject do not in all things correspond. At the same time, I recollect to have thought, when reading the account, that, on some points, the difference between us was more in expression than in sentiment. My only reason for mentioning this circumstance here, is to prevent the misconstruction of my silence in regard to him and other writers on the same subject, whose sentiments may either coincide with mine or stand in opposition to them. My silence in such cases proceeds neither from contempt nor from policy. They will come nearer the truth, and do me more justice, who shall ascribe it to ignorance.

I shall only add, with respect to the gentleman who did me the honour to translate my Dissertation into French, that though, upon the whole, he has acquitted himself admirably of the task he had undertaken, and has, in many things, improved upon his original, there are a few places in which he seems not perfectly to have apprehended my meaning. The cause of his mistake I find to have sometimes been an ambiguity or obscurity in the English expression I had employed. In such cases I have endeavoured to correct the fault in this edition, and give to the diction all the perspicuity possible. There is no quality in style more important, whatever be the subject; but in argumentative writings it is indispensable.

It is not the only, nor even the chief design of these sheets, to refute the reasoning and objections of Mr Hume, with regard to miracles: the chief design of them is, to set the principal argument for Christianity in its proper light. On a subject that has been so often treated, it is impossible to avoid saying many things which have been said before. It may, however, with reason, be affirmed, that there still remains, on this subject, great scope for new observations. Besides, it ought to be remembered, that the evidence of any complex argument depends very much on the order into which the material circumstances are digested, and the manner in which they are displayed.

The Essay on Miracles deserves to be considered as one of the most dangerous attacks that have been made on our religion. The danger results not solely from the merit of the piece: it results much more from that of the author. The piece itself, like every other work of Mr Hume, is ingenious; but its merit is more of the oratorial kind than of the philosophical. The merit of the author, I acknowledge, is great. The many useful volumes he has published of history, as well as on criticism, politics, and trade, have justly procured him, with all persons of taste and discernment, the highest reputation as a writer. What pity is it that this reputation should have been sullied by attempts to undermine the foundations both of natural religion and of revealed!

For my own part, I think it a piece of justice in me to acknowledge the obligations I owe the author before I enter on the proposed examination. I have not only been much entertained and instructed by his works, but, if I am possessed of any talent in abstract reasoning, I am not a little indebted to what he has written on Human Nature, for the improvement of that talent. lf, therefore, in this tract, I have refuted Mr Hume's Essay, the greater share of the merit is perhaps to be ascribed to Mr Hume himself. The compliment which the

Russian monarch, after the famous battle of Poltowa, paid the Swedish generals, when he gave them the honourable appellation of his "masters in the art of war," I may, with great sincerity, pay my acute and ingenious adversary.

I shall add a few things concerning the occasion and form of the following dissertation.

Some of the principal topics here discussed were more briefly treated in a sermon preached before the synod of Aberdeen, and are now made public at their desire. To the end that an argument of so great importance might be more fully and freely canvassed, than it could have been, with propriety, in a sermon, it was judged necessary to new-model the discourse, and to give it that form in which it now appears.

The edition of Mr Hume's Essays to which I always refer in this work, is that printed at London, in duodecimo, 1750, entitled, Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding. I have, since finishing this tract, seen a later edition, in which there are a few variations. None of them appeared to me so material as to give ground for altering the quotations and references here used. There is, indeed, one alteration, which candour required that I should mention: I have accordingly mentioned it in a note.*

The arguments of the Essayist I have endeavoured to refute by argument. Mere declamation I know no way of refuting but by analysing it; nor do I conceive how inconsistencies can be answered otherwise than by exposing them. In such analysis and exposition, which, I own, I have attempted without ceremony or reserve, an air of ridicule is unavoidable; but this ridicule, I am well aware, if founded in misrepresentation, will at last rebound upon myself. It is possible that, in some things, I have mistaken the author's meaning; I am conscious that I have not, in any thing, designedly misrepresented it.

*Part II. Sect. 5.

INTRODUCTION.

"CHRISTIANITY," it has been said, "is not founded in argument." If it were only meant, by these words, that the religion of Jesus could not, by the single aid of reasoning, produce its full effect upon the heart, every true Christian would cheerfully subscribe to them. No arguments, unaccompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God; though even to such conversion, arguments are, by the agency of the Spirit, rendered subservient. Again, if we were to understand by this aphorism, that the principles of our religion could never have been discovered by the natural and unassisted faculties of man; this position, I presume, would be as little disputed as the former. But if, on the contrary, under the cover of an ambiguous expression, it is intended to insinuate, that those principles, from their very nature, can admit no rational evidence of their truth, (and this, by the way, is the only meaning which can avail our antagonists,) the gospel, as well as common sense, loudly reclaims against it.

The Lord Jesus Christ, the author of our religion, often argued, both with his disciples and with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason. Without this faculty, he well knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law. He argued from prophecy, and the conformity of the event to the prediction. He argued from the testimony of John the Baptist, who was generally acknowledged to be a prophet.2 He argued from the miracles which he himself performed,3 as incontrovertible evidences that God Almighty operated by him, and had sent him. He expostulates with his enemies for not using their reason on this subject. "Why," says he, even of yourselves judge ye not what is right ?" In like manner we are called upon by the apostles of our Lord, to act the part of wise men, and judge impartially of what they say.5 Those who do so,

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are highly commended for the candour and prudence they discover in an affair of so great consequence. We are even commanded to be "always ready to give an answer to every man that asketh us a reason of our hope ;"7 "in meekness to instruct them that oppose themselves ;" and "earnestly to contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints."9 God has neither in natural nor revealed religion, "left himself without a witness;" but has in both given moral and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to

render inexcusable the atheist and the unbeliever. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine. We must "prove all things," as we are expressly enjoined in holy writ, if we would ever hope to "hold fast that which is good.""

Thus much I thought proper to premise, not to serve as an apology for the design of this tract, (the design surely needs no apology, whatever the world may judge of the execution,) but to expose the shallowness of that pretext, under which the advocates for infidelity in this age commonly take shelter. Whilst therefore, we enforce an argument, which, in support of our religion, was so frequently insisted on by its divine founder, we will not dread the reproachful titles of dangerous friends, or disguised enemies of revelation. Such are the titles which the writer, whose sentiments we propose in these papers to canvass, has bestowed on his antagonists; not, I believe, through malice against them, but as a sort of excuse for himself, or at least a handle for introducing a very strange and unmeaning compliment to the religion of his country, after a very bold attempt to undermine it. We will, however, do him the justice to own, that he has put it out of our power to retort the charge. No intelligent person who has carefully perused the Essay on Miracles, will impute to the author either of those ignominious characters.

My primary intention in undertaking an answer to the aforesaid essay, has invariably been, to contribute all in my power to the

defence of a religion which I esteem the greatest blessing conferred by Heaven on the sons of men. It is at the same time a secondary motive, of considerable weight, to vindicate philosophy, at least that most important branch of it which ascertains the rules of reasoning, from those absurd consequences which this author's theory naturally leads us to. The theme is arduous. The adversary is both subtle and powerful.

With such an adversary, I should on very unequal terms enter the lists, had I not the advantage of being on the side of truth. And an eminent advantage this doubtless is. It requires but moderate abilities to speak in defence of a good cause. A good cause demands but a distinct exposition and a fair hearing; and we may say with great propriety, it will speak for itself. But to adorn error with the semblance of truth, and make the worse appear the better reason, requires all the arts of ingenuity and invention; arts in which few or none have been more expert than Mr Hume. It is much to be regretted, that on some occasions he has so ill applied them.

PART FIRST.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY, AND RELIGIOUS MIRACLES ARE NOT LESS CAPABLE OF THIS EVIDENCE THAN OTHERS.

SECTION I.

MR HUME'S FAVOURITE ARGUMENT IS FOUNDED ON A FALSE HYPOTHESIS.

It is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a divine mission. His design is solely to prove, that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any religious system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believed on the testimony of others. "A miracle," says he, "supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument." Again, in the conclusion of his essay, "Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." Here he concludes against all miracles. "Any kind of miracle" are his express words. He seems, however, immediately sensible, that in asserting this, he has gone too far; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in the beginning. "We may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, and make it a

just foundation for any system of religion." In the note on this passage, he has these words: "I beg the limitation here made may | be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind, as to admit of proof from human testimony."

So much for that cardinal point, which the essayist labours so strenuously to evince; and which, if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us, on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs, but will directly lead to this general conclusion, "That it is impossible for God Almighty to give a revelation, attended with such evidence, that it can be reasonably believed in after ages, or even in the same age, by any person who has not been an eye-witness of the miracles by which it is supported."

Now by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out? Several topics have been employed for the purpose by this subtle disputant. Among these there is one principal argument, which he is at great pains to set off to the best advantage. Here indeed he claims a particular concern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, it is not my business to controvert; I confine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay before the reader the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found; taking the freedom, for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for! illustration. To do otherwise would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the essay.

"Experience," says he, "is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability; a uniform experience amounts to a proof. Probability always supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experiments, and deduct the lesser number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. Our belief or assurance of any fact from the report of eye-witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two oppo

"