The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive ScienceNick Chater, Mike Oaksford The rational analysis method, first proposed by John R. Anderson, has been enormously influential in helping us understand high-level cognitive processes. The Probabilistic Mind is a follow-up to the influential and highly cited 'Rational Models of Cognition' (OUP, 1998). It brings together developments in understanding how, and how far, high-level cognitive processes can be understood in rational terms, and particularly using probabilistic Bayesian methods. It synthesizes and evaluates the progress in the past decade, taking into account developments in Bayesian statistics, statistical analysis of the cognitive 'environment' and a variety of theoretical and experimental lines of research. The scope of the book is broad, covering important recent work in reasoning, decision making, categorization, and memory. Including chapters from many of the leading figures in this field, The Probabilistic Mind will be valuable for psychologists and philosophers interested in cognition. |
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Page 304
... stimuli involves comparing these stimuli to the set of exemplars in each category ( e.g. , Medin & Schaffer , 1978 ; Nosofsky , 1986 ) . Prototype models assume that a cate- gory is associated with a single prototype and categorization ...
... stimuli involves comparing these stimuli to the set of exemplars in each category ( e.g. , Medin & Schaffer , 1978 ; Nosofsky , 1986 ) . Prototype models assume that a cate- gory is associated with a single prototype and categorization ...
Page 319
... stimuli with value v on the dth feature that zy identifies as belonging to the same cluster as x B denotes the number of other stimuli in the same cluster . We use Bo = ẞ1 = 1 in all simulations . Medin and Schaffer's ( 1978 ) ...
... stimuli with value v on the dth feature that zy identifies as belonging to the same cluster as x B denotes the number of other stimuli in the same cluster . We use Bo = ẞ1 = 1 in all simulations . Medin and Schaffer's ( 1978 ) ...
Page 507
... stimuli , people frequently make strong links between events , even on a single trial - based on , e.g. , temporal ... stimuli over which no regularities are defined— because the stimuli are arbitrary ( e.g. , consisting of random dot ...
... stimuli , people frequently make strong links between events , even on a single trial - based on , e.g. , temporal ... stimuli over which no regularities are defined— because the stimuli are arbitrary ( e.g. , consisting of random dot ...
Contents
prospects for a Bayesian cognitive science | 3 |
A primer on probabilistic inference | 33 |
Rational analyses instrumentalism and implementations | 59 |
Copyright | |
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The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Nick Chater,Mike Oaksford Limited preview - 2008 |
The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Nick Chater,Mike Oaksford No preview available - 2008 |
Common terms and phrases
algorithm alternative analysis approach approximate argument associated assumed assumption attribute Bayesian behavior beliefs Cambridge causal cause Chater choice cluster cognitive complexity computational concept conditional consider correlation decision depends described developed distribution effect environment estimate et al evidence example expected experience experimental explain framing function given heuristic human hypothesis important individual inference involved Journal judgment language learning logic mean memory methods natural normative Oaksford objects observed optimal options outcomes parameters participants particular performance possible posterior predictions present Press principle prior probabilistic probability problem produce prospect Psychological question rational rational analysis reasoning reference relation relative represent representation require response Review rule sample Science selection semantic shows similar simple statistical structure subjective suggest task theory tion trials University utility variables weight