The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive ScienceNick Chater, Mike Oaksford The rational analysis method, first proposed by John R. Anderson, has been enormously influential in helping us understand high-level cognitive processes. The Probabilistic Mind is a follow-up to the influential and highly cited 'Rational Models of Cognition' (OUP, 1998). It brings together developments in understanding how, and how far, high-level cognitive processes can be understood in rational terms, and particularly using probabilistic Bayesian methods. It synthesizes and evaluates the progress in the past decade, taking into account developments in Bayesian statistics, statistical analysis of the cognitive 'environment' and a variety of theoretical and experimental lines of research. The scope of the book is broad, covering important recent work in reasoning, decision making, categorization, and memory. Including chapters from many of the leading figures in this field, The Probabilistic Mind will be valuable for psychologists and philosophers interested in cognition. |
From inside the book
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Page 364
... objects based on observations and a second layer for inferring new events based on objects . Each vertical column represents a different time step . Because of the converging causal arrows in the object layer , an object from the last ...
... objects based on observations and a second layer for inferring new events based on objects . Each vertical column represents a different time step . Because of the converging causal arrows in the object layer , an object from the last ...
Page 371
... objects and the sequence provided to the observation nodes consisted of the same 3 objects cycling in the same order . These three objects correspond to the solid , dashed , or dotted probability lines , respectively . The simulation ...
... objects and the sequence provided to the observation nodes consisted of the same 3 objects cycling in the same order . These three objects correspond to the solid , dashed , or dotted probability lines , respectively . The simulation ...
Page 372
... objects because it does not have a layer above to explain away its representation from objects even further in the past . Figure 16.10 was accomplished with N = 3 ( 4 layers ) . Additional simulations with N set to higher values ...
... objects because it does not have a layer above to explain away its representation from objects even further in the past . Figure 16.10 was accomplished with N = 3 ( 4 layers ) . Additional simulations with N set to higher values ...
Contents
prospects for a Bayesian cognitive science | 3 |
A primer on probabilistic inference | 33 |
Rational analyses instrumentalism and implementations | 59 |
Copyright | |
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The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Nick Chater,Mike Oaksford Limited preview - 2008 |
The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Nick Chater,Mike Oaksford No preview available - 2008 |
Common terms and phrases
algorithm alternative analysis approach approximate argument associated assumed assumption attribute Bayesian behavior beliefs Cambridge causal cause Chater choice cluster cognitive complexity computational concept conditional consider correlation decision depends described developed distribution effect environment estimate et al evidence example expected experience experimental explain framing function given heuristic human hypothesis important individual inference involved Journal judgment language learning logic mean memory methods natural normative Oaksford objects observed optimal options outcomes parameters participants particular performance possible posterior predictions present Press principle prior probabilistic probability problem produce prospect Psychological question rational rational analysis reasoning reference relation relative represent representation require response Review rule sample Science selection semantic shows similar simple statistical structure subjective suggest task theory tion trials University utility variables weight