The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive ScienceNick Chater, Mike Oaksford The rational analysis method, first proposed by John R. Anderson, has been enormously influential in helping us understand high-level cognitive processes. The Probabilistic Mind is a follow-up to the influential and highly cited 'Rational Models of Cognition' (OUP, 1998). It brings together developments in understanding how, and how far, high-level cognitive processes can be understood in rational terms, and particularly using probabilistic Bayesian methods. It synthesizes and evaluates the progress in the past decade, taking into account developments in Bayesian statistics, statistical analysis of the cognitive 'environment' and a variety of theoretical and experimental lines of research. The scope of the book is broad, covering important recent work in reasoning, decision making, categorization, and memory. Including chapters from many of the leading figures in this field, The Probabilistic Mind will be valuable for psychologists and philosophers interested in cognition. |
From inside the book
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Page 150
... beliefs . Now suppose that Test 2 provides such strong evidence for Disease A that beliefs once again become 76 % Disease A , and 8 % for each of the other diseases . Any measure of the value of information that positively values ...
... beliefs . Now suppose that Test 2 provides such strong evidence for Disease A that beliefs once again become 76 % Disease A , and 8 % for each of the other diseases . Any measure of the value of information that positively values ...
Page 151
... beliefs could fluctuate indefinitely . ) About 11 % of the time , however , both features are present . For the sequential learner , this causes beliefs about the probability of glom to change from 75 % to 25 % , after feature 1 is ...
... beliefs could fluctuate indefinitely . ) About 11 % of the time , however , both features are present . For the sequential learner , this causes beliefs about the probability of glom to change from 75 % to 25 % , after feature 1 is ...
Page 223
... beliefs in light of new evidence . By and large the experienced dif- ference quickly tracks the description difference ( see the horizontal line ) , the reason being that the Laplacian assumption counteracts the possible extreme ...
... beliefs in light of new evidence . By and large the experienced dif- ference quickly tracks the description difference ( see the horizontal line ) , the reason being that the Laplacian assumption counteracts the possible extreme ...
Contents
prospects for a Bayesian cognitive science | 3 |
A primer on probabilistic inference | 33 |
Rational analyses instrumentalism and implementations | 59 |
Copyright | |
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The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Nick Chater,Mike Oaksford Limited preview - 2008 |
The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science Nick Chater,Mike Oaksford No preview available - 2008 |
Common terms and phrases
algorithm alternative analysis approach approximate argument associated assumed assumption attribute Bayesian behavior beliefs Cambridge causal cause Chater choice cluster cognitive complexity computational concept conditional consider correlation decision depends described developed distribution effect environment estimate et al evidence example expected experience experimental explain framing function given heuristic human hypothesis important individual inference involved Journal judgment language learning logic mean memory methods natural normative Oaksford objects observed optimal options outcomes parameters participants particular performance possible posterior predictions present Press principle prior probabilistic probability problem produce prospect Psychological question rational rational analysis reasoning reference relation relative represent representation require response Review rule sample Science selection semantic shows similar simple statistical structure subjective suggest task theory tion trials University utility variables weight