Or if any creature enjoy it, must be a creature, whofe will is exactly conformable to his. The will of God is the fupreme rule of conduct to all rational creatures, as well as to himself: as none but He can be independent. He made his will known to the first man, by writing his law in his heart: but this laid no reftraint upon him till fin entered; becaufe he followed his own will, in yielding obedience to his Creator. When fin fhall be totally abolished in the people of God, and their will reftored to its primitive conformity to the will of God, they will then be restored to perfect liberty; because they will fulfil their own will, in doing the will of their God and Saviour: and will be incapable to take pleasure in any thing that he prohibits. This is the cafe, even in this world, as far as they are fanctified: Hence, like David, they walk at liberty, because they seek God's precepts. This is that glorious liberty, wherewith Christ hath made us free.

But, as all men, whether faints or finners, while in this life, have much corruption about them, their wills must always be inclined, more or lefs, to what is contrary to God's will, and is prohibited by his law. That law, therefore, will always prove a great reftraint upon the liberty of mortals. Supposing mankind to be in what is called the state of nature, before the formation of fociety, or the erection of government of any kind: in that cafe, no man was under any fubjection to the will of any fellow-creature, nor was his will under any other refraint but the law of nature. Even in that ftate he could have no right to kill, to lie, or do any thing elfe which God in that law had forbidden. Thus, every man would have had an unreftrained right to follow his own will, as far as it was agreeable to the law of nature.

And

H

And this is, precifely, what ought to be called natural liberty.

Though this natural liberty can never be increased by any human inftitution; becaufe men can never have power to abolish, or to leffen the obligation of the law of God: yet this liberty may be abridged by human autho rity; and must be fo, wherever fociety exifts. When any number of men fet up any form of government among themselves, they must not only fix certain regulations, at the first, according to which they will be governed; but they must likewife eftablish, in fome hand or other, a power of making laws for time to come. E very member of that fociety muft give up his natu ral liberty, fo far, as not only to fubmit to the fundamental regulations formally agreed to by the whole, but alfo to the will of those who form the legislature in the fociety, in all things that are not contrary to the law of nature. But he parts with this portion of his natu ral liberty, only upon condition of his being fo protected by the community, or by thofe to whofe hands the adminiftration is entrusted, that none may have pow er to lay any restraint upon his will, but what is laid upon him, by the laws of God or of his country. This is what has been called civil liberty.

Hence it is manifeft, that no man, in the due exercife of reafon will ever claim the unrestrained use of natural liberty, in the focial ftate. The will of every individual must be fubject to the public will. But if the government is rightly constituted, every one has a fuffi. cient compenfation for that portion of his liberty which he gives up, in the protection which he enjoys, under the wings of the law. And no man has ground to complain, while no restraint is laid upon him by the public will, but what is for the general good.

Every one knows that all, governments are not alike friendly to liberty. Some allow the fubject to retain a greater share of his natural liberty, and fome a lefs. And that government is always the beft, where most of it is fuffered to remain, provided the ends of government are gained. This is the very thing, that, above all others, fhews the excellence of our government, and conftitutes British liberty. We are not only fecured against subjection to the will of any man, or any fet of men, contrary to law; but the law itfelf allows us to follow the dictates of our own will in more cafes, and lays us under fewer reftraints, than the laws of any other country do. A British subject may do with himfelf, and with all that is his own, just what he pleases, so long as he does no injury to his fellow subjects, or to the community at large.

It is likewife evident, that it is impoffible to frame any government in fuch a manner, as that all who live under it should be alike free. Suppofing a government so perfect as to have every law Enacted, that could conduce to the good of the nation, and no more, it is evident, that the man who was most disposed to promote the public good, would always have moft liberty; because, in doing what he pleased, he would just do what the law required. On the other hand, if there exifted in that nation, an enemy to his country, or one who wished to promote his own intereft, by oppreffing or injuring his fellow subjects, that man would live under continual reftraint. He would be a flave in the midst of a free nation; because he could never follow his own will, without tranfgreffing the laws. Hence it follows, that, under every good government, the most virtuous man is always moft free: and the most wicked will always be under the greatest reftraint. No government

can

can be faid to be unfriendly to liberty, because the covetous man is reftrained from stealing, or the man of blood from murder. It is the principal end of laws to prevent fuch men from following the dictates of their depraved will: and when laws cannot do it, they must be reftrained by punishments. It is therefore nothing to the disadvantge of any government, to find wicked men complaining of want of liberty under it, while the honeft, induftrious, virtuous citizen feels himself under no restraint. And this affords no small prefumption in favour of our conftitution. They among us, who, fince the days of Wilkes and liberty, have always been moft clamourous for more liberty, have been the very perfons who ftood moft in need of the reftraints of law.

This obfervation is peculiarly applicable to thofe men who are continually harping upon the LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. This branch of civil liberty, as well as every other, however valuable, must have its bounds. If every man was to be allowed to publifh what he pleafes, without being answerable for it when published, as well might every one be permitted to do what he will, without being anfwerable for what he does. To every man of common generofity, his reputation is as dear as his life. A public flanderer, therefore, is as dangerous an enemy to fociety, as an affaffin. And to give free toleration to the one is equally pernicious as to grant it to the other. A libel upon the conftitution and laws of the country is furely as prejudicial as a libel upon a private character. It is a peculiar happiness of British subjects, that every one is at liberty freely to publish, as well as to fpeak his fentiments, concerning public meafures. This is an advantage to the conftitution, and even to adminiftration; because they have, thereby, an opportunity to avail themselves of the wisdom of indivi

duals,

duals, not connected with government. But this liberty may be abused. A man may fpeak treafon, and why may he not print it? And if he who speaks it in a private company may be punished, why should not he who fpreads it through the whole nation, by his writings. Men of loyal, peaceable, or even moderate principles, feel themselves under no restraint: and if feditious men are in high dudgeon, because they are not allowed to fow the feeds of rebellion with impunity, it is no more to be wondered at, than a thief's crying out against the gallows.

That liberty of the prefs, which is the acknowledged birth-right of every British fubject, does not confift in being allowed to publish what one pleases, without being accountable for it. But "precifely in this, that

neither courts of juftice, nor any other judges whatever, are allowed to take any notice of writings in"tended for the prefs; but are confined to those which "are actually published: and in thefe cafes, must pro"ceed by trial by jury*.” Or, to use the words of a learned judge," It confifts in laying no previous ref"traints upon publications, and not in freedom from "cenfure for criminal matter when published. Every "freeman has an undoubted right to lay what fenti"ments he pleafes before the public: to forbid this is "to deftroy the freedom of the prefs: but if he pub"lishes what is improper, mifchievous, or illegal, he "muft take the confequence of his own temerity +." This is all the liberty that even Mr Erfkine pleads for, in his celebrated fpeech at Mr Paine's trial. The general

De Lolme, p. 297.

+ Blackstone's Com. vol. iv. p. 151, 152.