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26

On saying " Not at Home."-Requiem of the Queen of France. [JAN

a good conscience, that they may be
ashamed that falsely accuse your
good conversation in Christ."

TUUM EST.

lying idle, will have quite as large a field as the others.

Not to leave the subject imperfect, I will just observe, that during my time at Oxford a custom obtained, called sporting out, that is, of shutting one's-self up in his room, and,

To the Editor of the Christian Observer. when any application was made at

Mr. Editor, WITH Many

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of your correspondents I condemn the practice of saying "not at home," when the fact is not so. Archbishop Secker, when questioned on the subject, said, that the first man who used the expression told a lie. I think, that all his followers have done the same. But I have a new and additional proposal to make for the remedy of the evil. There are two causes which producé the incorrect answer alluded to, whether volunteered by the servant, or enjoined by the master. It is, in the first place, the natural and direct answer to the usual question, "Is Mr. at home?" And the nega tive is given, because it is apprehended that a denial, in any other form, may occasion offence. Now what I propose is, that the question of the visitor should be, not, Is Mr. at home? but, Is he disengaged? or, Does he see company? The natural and direct answer would then be in favour of truth; and the inquirer, by the very form of the inquiry, would set the mind of the servant at rest, respecting the fear of offence, in giving the very answer that was invited. It would answer the further good purpose, to the servant, if he had any conscience, and to the master, should it come to his ears, and he had any likewise, of a delicate reproof of the usual practice. The last advantage, which I shall mention is, that it will set exactly a double number of reformers to work; for, supposing visitors and visited to be equal in number, a very fair supposition, the former, instead of

the door, maintaining a perfect silence. As the wealthy are most exposed to unwelcome visitors, might they not have a small room in the in which they might take refuge for house appropriated to this purpose, the time, whenever they wished to be invisible? If the less wealthy would consent to be shut up in closet, might not this answer as well? Yours, &c.

VERAX.

To the Editor of the Christian Observer.

In the account of the funeral of the Queen of France, which is given in the public papers, it is said, that “a Requiem was sung by the full choir of Westminster Abbey, accompanied by the organs." Either this passage is worded with very blameable inaccuracy, or it brings a strange fact to the knowledge of Protestants. I forbear all comment upon it at present, in the hope that my fears niay have anticipated something more mischievous in this occurrence than, on inquiry, might be justified by the matter of fact. I therefore trouble you with this application to request that some one of your correspondents, who may have the means of ascertaining with ACCURACY the particulars of the case, would state them, for the information of your readers, and would also furnish you with a copy of the Requiem, that the nature of this particular transaction may be known to the public.

I remain, &c.

D. C.

REVIEW OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

17

Hints on Toleration, in Five Essays. 1. On the Right of Society to investigate the Religious Principles of its Subjects. 2. On Specific Limitations to the Extent of an enlightened Religious Toleration. 3. On Eligibility to Offices of Public Trust. 4. On Licensing Persons and Places for the Performance of Divine Worship. 5. On the Libarty of the Press. Suggested for the Consideration of the Rt. Hon. Lord Viscount Sidmouth and the Dissenters. By PHILAGATHARCHES. London: Cadell and Davies. 1810. 8vo. pp. 367.

THE anonymous author of these essays, who is professedly a dissenter, and whom we should suppose to be a minister of the dissenting class, is evidently a serious and orthodox Christian. He observes in his preface, that," if his work should excite any considerable interest in the public mind, he shall proceed to complete the task he has undertaken, by adding some further chapters on the nature, justness, &c. of an enlightened religious toleration." His work appears to have been suggest ed by thecircumstances of the times, which call, as he says, "for the babishment of every thing which could engender discord;" and more partieslarly by the expected agitation of the question of the licences of dissenting teachers, on the part of Lord Sidmouth, to whose consideration this book is especially submitted. In one important point he cordially agrees with his lordship, namely, in the opinion that the Roman Catholics ought not to be admitted into offices of trust. Indeed, he goes very far beyond that respectable Viscount in his jealousy of the Roman Catholics; for he would not even admit their evidence in courts of justice; a point to which we shall

presently return. But in respect to his general theory of toleration, and his application of it to protestant dissenters, we apprehend that he is very much at variance with his Lordship.

This work is written dispassionately; and it breathes at once a spirit of liberty, and of subinission to lawful government. The author has evidently applied himself with much diligence to his subject; his style is clear and simple; and though many obvious things are said, we are in several respects prepossessed in his favour. He affords however, as we think, a striking instance of the practical errors into which men are apt to be betrayed, when they attempt to systematize, in their closet, on a great and comprehensive subject; and to lay down the various exceptions, as well as the rules, which ought to be adopted by those who are engaged in political life.

The course which has been taken by the legislators of this country, whose errors it is the object of this writer to point out, has been directly the reverse of that which he has pursued. They have seldom had reference to any code, while they have been engaged in the work of legislation. When they have discovered an existing evil, or have felt a pressing danger, they have resorted to some enactments in order to remove it. They have often acted vehemently, on the spur of some occasion, and have not seldom delayed to repeal or mitigate their law, when circumstances no longer demanded its continuance. In general, the voice of the public, as well as that of the aggrieved party, has been lifted up in favour of the repeal, antecedently to its being carried in Parliament. However exceptionable the conduct of the British legislature may sometimes have been, ins

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consequence of this mode of acting, we have no difficulty in saying that it is a far safer course than that other extreme, to which the present author, in common with a great portion of his dissenting brethren, is inclined. But it is time that we proceed to shew what are the tenets which he would inculcate, and what the limitations and exceptions, by which he has himself felt that it is necessary to qualify his principles. Our author begins his work with a critique on the term Toleration, in which, as we are in haste to enter into a discussion of main principles, rather than of words, we shall not follow him.

His first Essay is on the right of a government to investigate the religi. ous principles of its subjects. This right, which he very inaccurately also calls the right of controlling conscience, he generally denies, on the ground that the principles of the social compact do not concede it to rulers, and that society is not injured by principles while they remain in the breast of individuals.

It might be difficult to know precisely what is meant either by the controul of conscience, or the investigation of the religious principles of individuals, if the extent of our author's meaning were not made manifest by various parts of his work. "The attention of the magistrate (he affirms in one place) ought to be exclusively directed to these two points, the preservation of morality, and the security of every individual's person, &c." "He has no hesitation (he again says) in answering in the affirmative the following question: Can all the advantages which religion is capable of procuring to the state, be enjoyed without the production of those evils, which have always followed judicial interference, to suppress one mode, and establish another?" We find many other expressions of the same sort. He evidently, therefore, intends to deny generally, the right of a legislature to give any kind of preference to one mode of religion over another; so

that his doctrine, though it might not always be suspected of proceeding so far, amounts, as we conceive, to a general affirmation of the unlawfulness of setting up religious establishments; from whence also may be deduced the duty of overthrowing, with all convenient speed, as many of these as may happen to exist, their existence itself, and not the nature of the particular institution, constituting that evil, or sin against society, which it is necessary to put down.

But, happily, our author not only forbears from distinctly asserting, in the present volume,the whole of that duty which we have mentioned, but he also introduces, in the progress of his work, a variety of remarks well calculated to supply an answer to the whole theory with which he sets out. It is said that there is in the tail of some serpents, an antidote for the evil of their own bite. We by no means wish to represent our author as any other than an upright and well-meaning man; but if he be a serpent, he is one of this singular and less noxious class.

We proceed now to exemplify our remark. After stating that even "the more complicated duties of the legislature should not involve the exercise of any influence in the promotion of one system of religious opinions to the detriment of another," he observes that " in a refined and polished form of government, the duties of the magistrate ought, at the same time, to embrace a regard to public morality, and a countenance to religion in general, for these he considers as the firmest bond of social ́union.' Is the magistrate to countenance religion in general? This is a great point conceded to us: then why not Christianity in particular? But perhaps it is Christianity, though Christianity in general, and not merely religion in general, that this author would wish the magistrate to countenance :-the serious character of the present work inclines us to the supposition. At any rate, this Christian writer can surely have no

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objection to the amendment of his term, which we would suggest. It is in full accordance with the language of the great champion of toleration, Mr. Locke.

But we proceed a step further. General Christianity is often no Christianity it is apt to approach very nearly, at least, to deism or to scepticism. The true Gospel unquestionably has some characteristic doctrines, doctrines of peculiar potency, serving strikingly to distinguish it both from general Christianity, commonly so called, and from general religion. This is a point which our author is far too orthodox and pious not to know. He doubtless knows it by the experience of his own breast, and, if he be a minister, by the efficacious influence of those doctrines on the life and conversation of his hearers, whom they have contributed to make both better relatives, better neighbours, better subjects, and, in every sense, better men. Our author, however, observes, in one part of his first essay, that the "preservation of the morality of the state, and the peace of the individual, are points perfectly distinct from forms of worship, and systems of religion." He must excuse our saying, that we entertain far too good an opinion of him to believe that this remark, so common in the mouths of some of his more latitudinarian brethren, can express his deliberate judgment. By systems of religion he surely must mean to designate nothing less than doctrines of religion; and how any material. doctrine of religion can be perfectly distinct from the preservation of morality in general, or how morality in general can be distinct from the morality of the state, we profess our-. selves to be utterly at a loss to conceive. In another place he uses the words" speculative opinions;" but is any sound and scriptural doctrine purely speculative? Is it not sure to have an influence on the conduct, either more or less powerful, either more or less direct? This way of resolving sentiments in religion,

which we derive from Scripture, into speculative opinions, has always appeared to us to be the error of a sceptical irreligious party, which in recent times has grown up among us, and to be contrary to every notion of true philosophy as well as sound religion. We do not mean to affirm that all diversities of opinions on religious matters are of equal moment, or even that all opinions which are of some moment ought to be the objects of legislation. We are quarrelling only with the species of distinction with which this writer is setting out. We are noticing an error which supplies him with the foundation of his system, and it is therefore necessary to dwell upon it.

The length to which our author goes in one part of his first essay really astonishes us. "Whether (says he) I bend the knee to Moloch, to the sovereign of Olympus, to the Inca of Mexico, to the prophet of Mecca,to the Virgin Mary, to Christ as a man, or to the Triune Jehovah, I infringe upon none of the rights or enjoyments of my neighbour, and am therefore in no degree amenable to the tribunal of political justice." The words used in this place, namely, by bending the knee to Moloch, &c. that is, by the mere act of worshipping Moloch, "I infringe upon none of the rights of my neighbour," are certainly true; but it is necessary to construe all these terms with a reference to what the author says in other places, to what he is evidently aiming at, and to what an ordinary reader may understand by them. Now our author clearly intends, not only that the law should not punish for thus bending the knee to Moloch, but that the state should not manifest any kind of preference to the worshippers of Christ over the worshippers of Moloch. He means that the religion of Christ has no more title to be established by the state, than the religion of Moloch; and that the one has no more title to be established than the other, because they are equal in respect to their tendency to provide good sub

jects to the state. We rejoice that he has spoken so strongly in this place, and that Moloch, that Moloch to whom children used to be made to pass through the fire (a striking proof of the innocency of such worship!), should be the competitor of Jesus Christ; competitor, we mean, in the great practical point of the comparative tendency of the two religions to form good subjects for the state.

We proceed, however, again to confront our author with himself. In the second chapter of his work, he studiously qualifies his principles; and he lays down a certain number of specific exceptions, which he thinks that a legislature ought to admit; and declares, as we before intimated, that he would exclude the the Roman Catholic from places of public trust, and even render inadmissible his evidence in a court of justice. He would, in like manner, proscribe the deist and the atheist; but he would apply no such exception to the worshippers of Moloch, of Jupiter, or of Mahomet. Is there not something preposterous in the very mention of a distinction of this sort? The ground of it is, that the Roman Catholic, the deist, and the atheist, are alike, as he conceives, unfit to be trusted on their oath, since their principles tend to render an oath not binding on their conscience. Thus, if we understand this author aright, a Roman Catholic,even though his religion should be that of three fourths of the country in which he lives, as is the case in Ireland at the present day, is to depend for the protection of his property, and of his very life, on the sole testimony of persons, from whose religious communion he is estranged. We will venture to say, that there is scarcely any persecution which could be greater than that which would follow from such a system as this. We have often had occasion to point out to our readers the deplorable state of our slaves in the West Indies. One of the worst characters of the WestIndia code is, the inadmissibility of the evidence of Blacks in courts of

justice. Our author would place the Roman catholics of Ireland in the same condition, in respect to this great and leading point.

But again: he allows of exceptions to be taken to the exercise of that general toleration for which he contends, in the case even of persons who "extenuate vice;" and he enumerates, among the vices to which his remark is specially applicable, the crimes of suicide and profane swearing. "If" (says he) "any man should publish to the world a system of theology so lax as to sanction vice under any of these modifications, it would become the duty of the magistrate to apply a coercive remedy for the suppression of sentiments so hostile to the tranquillity of the state, so inimical to domestic happiness, and so directly tending to universal anarchy." But suicide and profane swearing do not directly tend" either to univer.

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sal anarchy," or to the disturbance of the public tranquillity. Indirectly they tend that way so also does heathenism; for the heathen philosophers tolerated, and even countenanced, both the one and the other of these vices. The question is then, whether those religions, or modes of religion, which indirectly, though most clearly and surely, tend on the whole to vice, are to be countenanced equally with those which do not. The passage which we have last quoted, since it excepts against the inculcation of two vices, which only bear indirectly on the interests of the state, seems to concede the point.

Our author, as we think, is somewhat hampered by the distinctions which naturally occur on this head. It is necessary (says he) to discri minate "between those sentiments which are simply capable of being prostituted to seditious purposes, (we presume he means also immoral purposes) and those which involve that consequence as a legitimate and necessary result." The former sentiments alone he forbids us to restrain by penal laws, though the latter, as he thinks, ought also to be viewed

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