Page images
PDF
EPUB

of a whole system of physiology.'” Sumner, vol. I. p. 27.

Indeed, we think, that in the arrangement and execution of Mr. Sumner's Treatise, there is something more comprehensive and original, than in Dr. Brown's Essay. He reserves the chief strength of his reasoning for that exhibition of the traits of Divine wisdom and goodness which the world furnishes, and the evolution of which requires all that acuteness and discrimination, as well as extensive and accurate research, which he has bestowed upon it; while he leaves the beaten path, in which no one who wants a guide can be at a loss, in the hands of others, who have gone before or may follow him. We do not mean by this remark to impeach, in the slightest degree, the judgment of those highly qualified and respecta ble persons who have assigned the priority to Dr. Brown. The question before them was not simply which was the most masterly and able performance, but which exhibited, in the clearest light, all the proofs by which the existence, the power, the wisdom, and the goodness of the Deity are established, and the principal arguments by which objections to those truths may be refuted and the methodical simplicity of Dr. Brown, who has bestowed an equal degree of attention upon every part of the question, may be thought to have met more exactly the design of the founder than the more independent decision of Mr. Sumner, who has planted his standard wherever he thought his forces stood most in need of support.

We do not propose to dwell long on this part of the subject in either writer. The reasonings of Dr. Brown are generally perspicuous and simple, even where the argument is of a metaphysical kind: for he proceeds straight forward to his object, and does not perplex his reader with the intricacies which lie around him. At the

same time, for a work avowedly designed to be popular, we do not know if he has not given it too repulsive an air at the outset, by devoting the first chapter to an abstract disquisition on necessary existence, and the nature of causes and effects, although the doctrines contained in it are generally as plain as the subject will admit, and the following passage, on the connexion between casuality and mind, and the application of it to the great question at issue, is forcible and convincing:

"The muscles are the chief instruments of motion in animal bodies, and these we denominate the causes of that motion. But the muscles themselves are moved by the volition of the animal to whom they belong, though the manner in which this volition sets them, in motion, or the channel of communication between the living principle and the immediate mover is an impenetrable

mystery. There seems, however, to be a disposition in the human mind to assign the character of cause, in a distinguished manner, to that which has its origin in intention, design, and spirituality, and never to acquiesce in that casuali ty which is limited to material substance. Wherever there are manifest appearances of arrangement, contrivance, of adaptation of means to ends, and of ends uniformly pursued and attained, the mind cannot exclude the idea of a contriver,

of

intelligence to conceive, and of power

to execute, the purpose or object accomplished. The notions both of intelligence and power are suggested to us by the use of our own faculties and operations, seem interwoven with our most early conceptions, and obtrude themselves

on the whole course of our lives. In every instance, where intelligence and power are manifestly not original,and not necessarily inherent in the subjects to which they belong, the human mind will, by an irresistible propensity, which is, in reality, the source and spring of all philosophical inquiry, constantly employed in discovering causes, and in accounting for effects, refer such intelligence and power to an original source, from which these must have been de

rived, and without which they could not have existed. No sophistry, no specious delusion, no ingenuity of system, will ever banish those conceptions

from the mind of man." Brown, vol. I. given us continual occasion to feel pp. 36, 37.

And again

"From the idea of a first, original cause, the ideas of intelligence and power seem to be inseparable; and, till the mind is able to discover this, in some form, or substance, suited at least to the extent of its faculties, it seems never

completely to acquiesce in any solution of the phenomena, or appearance of nature, or of the laws by which they are regulated. To mind only can the strict and proper notion of causation be referred." Ib. vol. I. p. 39.

An objection likewise arises to his continual use of logical terms and distinctions; with which, in these days, the popular reader can hardly be supposed to be well acquainted, as in the passage

"Materialists have, certainly, attempted to place mind and matter in the same category; that is, to maintain that no spiritual substance exists, and that all the operations of our minds are the effects of material combinations and properties." Ib. vol. I. pp. 63, 64.

There is also an occasional repetition of the same argument in different parts of this book, which gives an air of weakness to the discussion, especially of so grave a subject. A remarkable instance of this occurs in the thirty-third and ninety-eighth pages, in regard to the propensity in children to ask a cause for every thing.

On arguments of such variety, and so briefly exhibited, it can hardly be doubted that occasional difference of judgment must arise. We cannot stop now to mention any trifling instances, where we differ from the author in the conduct of his reasoning in these chapters, which are among the best in the Essay while we are anxious to notice, with peculiar approbation, the bigh reverence which he uniformly manifests for the language of Scripture, and to observe the delightful solemnity with which an extract from the inspired volume always strikes the ear at the close of any uninspired disquisition. He has

:

this; and it always reminds us of the effect of which the multitude were conscious, when they heard our gracious Lord's Sermon on the Mount: "The people were astonished at his doctrine; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes." The author brings the whole book to a close as follows::

"The inherent force of the multiplied evidence in support of the existence of Deity, and the natural feelings of the human heart, have, generally, secured the speculative belief of this fundamental tice has not been adequate to the inteldoctrine, although its influence on praclectual conviction which it is calculated to produce, and has, in reality, operated.

"It appears, however, that it is possible to resist the clearest and strongest evidence, and, at the same time, that this occasional resistance is no argument against its validity. The blindness of individuals can never be alleged as a proof that sight is not one of the human senses, or that light is an imaginary term.

"The heavens, then, declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech, nor language, where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the

world!

"On all subjects connected with religion, how feeble is language merely human, compared with that which Inspiration dictates!" Ib. vol. I. pp. 178, 179.

Mr. Sumner, having concluded his short metaphysical argument for the being of a God, is thence led to inquire, whether some authentic record of the work of creation ascribed to him has not been left for the instruction of the world: whether some explicit declaration of his will has not been bequeathed to his creatures and the disquisition which then follows, on the existence and authenticity of the Mosaic history, and the consequences deducible from it, concludes the first volume in a way which seems to leave no alternative, but that of admitting

its truth. It would be unfair to abridge so complete and extended a discussion; yet we cannot omit to extract the following admirable and original reasoning of the author on the superior theology of Moses above that of the ancient philosophers, and on the manner in which it is to be accounted for, the rather because part of it will be found to elucidate an argument into which Mr. Heber's view of the religion and virtues of the heathen induced us to enter in our last volume, p. 594.

"Should it be still urged, that, allowing the founders of the Greek philosophy not to have made the proper conclusion from the arguments which prove the existence and unity of the Creator, yet there are arguments which demonstrate it, which might have occurred to Moses, though they did not occur in the same force to them: it may be farther shown, in reply, that this is no less untrue in fact than improbable in appearance. There are no arguments which can ascertain the existence of a Creator, which may not be referred either to the necessity of a First Cause, which is the method Clarke has followed; or to the appearances of design in the construction of the world, irresistibly indicating a Contriver, which is the ground which Paley, after a multitude of predecessors, has so ably taken and maintained.

I. Neither of these trains of reasoning were unperceived by the Grecian masters of philosophy. The very process pursued by Socrates is detailed at large. To his solid understanding, says Xenophon, it appeared contradictory and absurd to honour the painter and the statuary, because their senseless and inert imitations resemble the form of man, and not to honour the unseen Maker of man himself, endued with sense and motion. It seemed contradictory to admit design in the works of human art, which are seen to correspond with their intended use, and at the same time to suppose that the sensitive faculties of man proceed from chance: to allow to the mind of man the power of governing the body, and to deny to the Mind of the universe the power of ruling the world.

"By these and similar steps of analogy, to the force of which even the

reasoners of these latter times have made little addition except that arising from cumulative evidence, Socrates persuaded his bearers of the intelligence, the constant presence, and the superintendence of the gods; and seems to have. stood alone among the ancients, as was before observed, in applying his speculative belief to the practical purpose of regulating the lives and conduct of his disciples. Yet did he arrive at a distinct conclusion, or inculcate a simple belief of the unity, like Moses? To say nothing invidiously upon the obscurity which hung over his own mind, and which many of his habits betray,

for he was constant in sacrificing both in private, and at the public altars, and often applied to divination,') Xenophon, even whilst he is relating the successful arguments of Socrates, speaks commonly of a plurality of gods; and we find it openly asserted by his illustrious disciple Plato, in a strain the most opposite to that of Moses, that to discover the Artificer and Father of the universe, is indeed difficult; and that, when found, it is impossible to reveal him through the medium of discourse to mankind at large.' cordingly, in an oration supposed to be held in public, we find Plato reasoning to the people with every appearance of seriousness on the certainty of their having sprung from the soil of their own country.

Ac

But

"II. The other course of argument, viz. the necessary existence of an Eternal Being as the prime mover of the material part of the creation, was first insisted on, as far as I am aware, by Aristotle. The following passage, however, is sufficient to prove that it was well understood by that philosopher: 'I affirm,' he says, that the Deity is an animate Being, immortal, excellent; since life and an uninterrupted eternity belong to God; for this is God. they are in error who think, with the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, that what is most excellent and perfect is not the original; reasoning in this way, that the causes of plants and animals exist first in their seeds, from whence afterwards their perfection proceeds. For the seed of which they speak, comes itself from others that were before perfect; and the real original is not the seed, but the perfect plant or animal. It is plain, therefore, that there is some Being eternal and unchangeable, and separate from the objects of our senses.'

"Here we seem to have discovered

the truth for which we are searching; and might expect that the author of the sentences above cited, had established a system of pure theism. Yet in the same treatise which contains this sublime argument, we find, to the humiliation of reason, that this first moving Deity was incorporated by Aristotle with the world, which is supposed equally eternal and incorruptible with himself. So that it has even been a question, whether he who first saw the metaphysical necessity of a First Cause, ought not to be reckoned among the atheistical philosophers.

"Had there not been preserved to us passages of this nature, enabling us to judge of the effect produced by analogical and demonstrative argument, upon the mind which has no other instruction; it might not have been safe to deny that Moses could have been led by the mere force of such reasoning to assert the existence of one God, the Creator of heaven and earth. But knowing, as we thus do, the insufficient result both of analogical proof and systematic demonstration, we surely are bound to believe that some more sensible evidence lay before the writer, who, without stopping to argue, seizes the conclusion at which argument painfully arrives, with an effect which mere argument has never attained. For, even if we were to affirm that a train of reasoning, like those we have considered, was present to the mind of Moses, of which he published only the conclusion; that he declared the theorem, but withheld the steps of demonstration which led to it: what justice could there be in imagining that its effect would have proved more general than that of Socrates, or produced a system less embarrassed and inconclusive than we have found in Plato or Aristotle? Can it be contended that the Jews, in the time of Moses, were in such a state of improvement, as to see intuitively the process of argument which ended in the inference proposed to them? It may rather be affirmed, that no man could have proposed such an inference so nakedly and gratuitously, unless it were supported in the minds of his hearers, by familiar and indisputable testimony." Sumner, vol. I. pp. 203-208.

We quit this part of the subject with the clear and able statement CHRIST. OBSERV. No. 182.

of the author on the nature of the proofs which it exhibits.

"If the existence of an immaterial Creator is not a subject of mere speculation, but a fact upon which a certain course of action, and peculiar duties, depend; it is undoubtedly material to inquire what degree of evidence might justly be supposed to influence mankind, and bind them to the performance of those duties. The highest degrees of evidence are generally acknowledged to be intuition and demonstration. But intuitive evidence only acquaints us with our own existence: if, therefore, we admit this species of evidence alone, we confine our knowledge, and limit our actions, to the deductions from this single fact. If we expect demonstrative evidence, the only truth_relating to this subject, which cannot be denied without involving a contradiction, is the naked proposition, something has existed from eternity. Can it be reasonably argued, that we are to extend our belief no farther, and that no actions are binding upon us, that do not result from one of these acknowledged facts?

"If common sense revolts against such a conclusion, and if it is inconsistent with the nature of things, that intuitive or demonstrative evidence should reach all the various truths, about which the human mind is conversant; it becomes an interesting object of inquiry, what species of evidence ought to be deemed binding upon mankind; and whether, in the view of moral obligation, there is any just ground for that distinction between the degrees of evidence which has been commonly acquiesced in.

"If we consider the circumstances in which mankind are placed, it appears that the several kinds of evidence, that derived from intuition, from demonstration, from the senses, from moral reasoning, and from human testimony, have each their respective provinces, and, if complete in themselves, carry with them an equal degree of assurance. Our own existence we infer from consciousness. The existence of other things we perceive by sensation. Abstract truths we learn from demonstration.

But the use of moral evidence, and of that derived from human testimony, is far more general and upon these we depend, and must depend, not only in matters relating to the adQ

vancement of science and learning, but in almost every thing which concerns our conduct and directs the management of our lives.

"Any attempt to exalt one of these species of evidence to the depreciation of the rest, is scarcely less unphilosophical than to misapply them. Des Cartes has been justly ridiculed for taking the pains to prove his own existence by demonstration, which he learnt from consciousness. But it is, in fact, a similar absurdity to require demonstrative proof of that which we know by sensation, as the existence of external things; or to demand sensitive proof, or demonstrative proof, or intuitive conviction, of that which is in its own nature incapable of any other than what is called probable evidence, viz. the existence of such or such a person, or the occurrence of any particular fact, at a thousand miles distance, or a thousand years ago.

"If it be argued, that this evidence is liable to error, and may mislead us : I answer, that there is no evidence in which we may not be mistaken; and that it is our business to examine into it, and to take care that we are not deceived. We may be deceived even by trusting implicitly to intuitive evidence, by which it has been commonly asserted, that we immediately acquire the knowledge of our own existence.

But Mr. Stewart has acutely observed, that it is not our own existence which we learn from consciousness, but the existence of the sensation, from which the understanding infers the existence of the sentient being.

"Berkeley and Hume argue, that the senses may be deceived, and therefore require other and farther proof of the existence of a material world. But so may reason be deceived. How grossly was the reason of the greatest philosophers, from the age of Aristotle to that of Reid, mistaken, in supposing that the ideas we possess of external objects were resemblances of those objects! It is no doubt true, that we cannot be mistaken as to the notions of our own minds: but we may be mistaken as to their relation to other notions, in which mode alone can they furnish us with demonstrative knowledge. Even with respect to mathematical truths, the proper field of demonstration: can any thing, except imagination or theory, persuade a mathematician, that he is more certain of the equality or inequality of

"

certain angles, which he proves by demonstration, than of the real existence of the pen with which he describes his diagram, which he learns by sensation?

"The object of these remarks is by no means to throw a doubt over the certainty of all evidence, but to question the propriety of allowing the justice of the distinction commonly made between the several species of evidence. In conducting the affairs of life, undoubtedly, the proper inquiry is, not whether a particular fact or proposition is supported by the highest degree of evidence, but, whether the evidence on which it rests is of the proper sort, and complete, according to the matter about which it is conversant. The world is so constituted, that we must sometimes depend upon consciousness, and sometimes upon our senses: that in some cases we must be guided by reasoning, whether demonstrative or analogical, and in others by human testimony: the force therefore of each species of evidence is equal, and in their peculiar province the power of each is paramount and all that we can require is, to know the truth according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of the particular case can yield.

"Indeed, if it were not just and reasonable to place effectual reliance on what is termed probable evidence, the business of the world would soon stand still. Human testimony is the mainspring of all that is planned or done at the bar, in the forum, or in the senate. Moral probability is all that we attain, or seek to attain, in politics or jurisprudence, or even in most of the sciences. Nor is it too much to affirm, that every individual risks, without hesitation, his health, or his life, or his fortune, or reputation, daily in some way or other, on the strength of evidence which, if it came to be narrowly examined, would not appear to have half the certainty which we may arrive at, respecting the miraculous deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt, and the veracity of the Mosaic records. The word probable, when applied to evidence of this nature, does not imply any deficiency in the proof, but only marks the particular nature of that proof, as contradistinguished from other species of evidence. It is opposed not to what is certain, but to what admits of being demonstrated after the manner of mathematicians.'

« PreviousContinue »