opinions, feveral difficulties, for which human reafon can but ill account; which may therefore be not improperly stiled Articles of Faith. Such is the origin of evil under the government of an all-good and allpowerful God; a queftion fo hard, that the inability of folving it in a fatisfactory manner to their apprehenfions, has driven fome of the greatest philofophers into the monftrous and fenfelefs opinions of Manicheifm, and Atheism. Such is the reconciling the prefcience of God with the free-will of man, which, after much thought on the fubject, Mr. Locke fairly confeffes he could not do, though he acknowledged both; and what Mr. Locke could not do, in reafoning upon fubjects of a metaphyfical nature, I am apt to think few men, if any, can hope to perform.

*

Such is alfo the creation of the world at any fuppofed time, or the eternal production of it from God; it being almoft equally hard, according to mere philofophical no

See his Letter to Mr. Molyneux, P. 509. v. 3.

tions, either to admit that the goodness of God could remain unexerted through all eternity before the time of fuch a creation, let it be fet back ever fo far, or to conceive an eternal production; which words, fo applied, are inconfiftent and contradictory terms; the folution commonly given by a comparison to the emanation of light from the fun, not being adequate to it, or just; for light is a quality inherent in fire, and naturally emaning from it; whereas matter. is not a quality inherent or emaning from the Divine effence, but of a different fubftance and nature, and if not independent and felf-exifting, muft have been created by a mere act of the Divine will; and if created, then not eternal, the idea of creation implying a time when the fubftance created did not exist. But if, to get rid of this difficulty, we have recourfe, as many of the ancient philofophers had, to the independent exiflence of matter, then we must admit two self-exisling principles, which is quite inconfiftent with genuine theism, or natural reafon. Nay, could that be ad

mitted,

mitted, it would not yet clear up the doubt, unless we fuppofe not only the eternal existence of matter independent of God, but that it was from eternity in the order and beauty we fee it in now, without any agency of the Divine power; otherwise the fame difficulty will always occur, why it was: not before put into that order and state of perfection; or how the goodness of God could fo long remain in a state of inaction, unexerted and unemployed. For were the time of fuch an exertion of it put back ever fo far; if, inftead of five or fix thoufand years, we were to fuppofe millions of millions of ages to have paffed fince the world* was reduced out of a Chaos to an harmonious and regular form, still a whole eternity must ̧ have preceded that date, during which the Divine attributes did not exert themselves in that beneficent work, fo fuitable to them,

* By the world I do not mean this earth alone, but the whole material universe, with all its inhabitants. Even created fpirits fall under the fame reasoning; for they must also have had a beginning, and before that beginning an eternity must have preceded...

that

that the conjectures of human reason can find no caufe for its being delayed.

But because of thefe difficulties, or any other that may occur in the fyftem of Deism, no wife man will deny the being of God, or his infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, which are proved by fuch evidence as carries the clearest and strongest conviction, and cannot be refused without involving the mind in far greater difficulties, even in downright abfurdities and impoffibilities. The only part therefore that can be taken is, to account in the best manner that our weak reafon is able to do, for fuch feeming objections; and where that fails, to acknowledge its weakness, and acquiefce under the certainty, that our very imperfect knowledge or judgment cannot be the measure of the Divine wifdom, or the univerfal ftandard of truth. So likewife it is with respect to the Chriftian religion. Some difficulties occur in that Revelation, which human reason can hardly clear; but as the truth of it stands upon evidence fo ftrong and convincing, that it cannot be denied without

G

without much greater difficulties than those that attend the belief of it, as I have before endeavoured to prove, we ought not to reject it upon fuch objections, however mortifying they may be to our pride. That indeed would have all things made plain to ús; but God has thought proper to proportion our knowledge to our wants, not our pride. All that concerns our duty is clear; and as to other points either of natural or revealed religion, if he has left some obfcurities in them, is that any reasonable cause of complaint? Not to rejoice in the benefit of what he has graciously allowed us to know, from a presumptuous disgust at our incapacity of knowing more, is as abfurd as it would be to refuse to walk, becaufe we cannot fly.

From the arrogant ignorance of metaphyfical reafonings, aiming at matters above our knowledge, arofe all the fpeculative impiety, and many of the worft fuperftitions of the old heathen world, before the Gospel was preached to bring man back again to the primitive faith; and from the fame fource

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