they thought that even he had approached too near to dogmatism in saying that he knew that he knew nothing. Probable opinion was the furthest point in the direction of knowledge to which man could attain. The Academic argument put into the mouth of Cotta in the 3rd book of the N. D. is mainly derived from Clitomachus, the literary exponent of the views of his master Carneades, who is said to have never written anything himself. The New Academy commences with Philo (N. D. 1 59, 113), a pupil of Clitomachus and one of Cicero's teachers. In it we see a return to dogmatism combined with an eclectic tendency which showed itself most strongly in Philo's pupil Antiochus (N. D. 1 6, 16), who endeavoured to reform the Academy by uniting Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines with the original Platonism. Cicero studied under him and used some of his writings for the De Finibus. Brutus, to whom the N. D. is addressed, was one of the most distinguished adherents of this stoicized Academy.

We turn now to the two most important developments of postAristotelian philosophy, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To understand them it is necessary to look for a moment at the changes which had been brought about by the conquests of Alexander. While Greece proper lost its national life, the Greek language and Greek civilization spread throughout the world, and the Greeks in their turn became familiarized with Oriental thought and religion. Thus the two main supports of the authoritative tradition by which practical life had hitherto been regulated, the law of the State and the old religion of Greece, were shaken from their foundations. The need which was most strongly felt by the best minds was to find some substitute for these, some principle of conduct which should enable a man to retain his self-respect under the rule of brute force to which all were subject. It must be something which would enable him to stand alone, to defy the oppressor, to rise superior to circumstances. Such a principle the Stoics boasted to have found. Zeno (N. D. I 36 al.), the founder of the school, was a native of Citium in Cyprus. He came to Athens about 320 B.C. and attended the lectures of Crates the Cynic and afterwards of Stilpo the Megarian and of some of the Academics, and began to teach in the σroά TOLKίAn about 308 B.C. He was succeeded by Cleanthes of Assos in Asia Minor about 260 B.C. (N. D. 1 37, II 13, 24, 40, 111 63). Among his other pupils were Aristo of Chius (N. D. 1 37), Herillus of

Carthage, Persaeus, who like his master was a native of Citium (N. D. 1 38), Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, the author of two astronomical poems translated by Cicero (N. D. 11 104–115). Cleanthes was succeeded by Chrysippus of Soli (b. 280, d. 206), who developed and systematized the Stoic philosophy (N. D. 1 39 al.). Next came Zeno of Tarsus, and Diogenes of Babylon, one of the three ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C. From this time forward Stoicism begins to show a softened and eclectic tendency, as we may see in Panaetius of Rhodes (180-111 B.C.), the friend of Scipio and Laelius, whose work Teρì Tоû Kalýкоvтos formed the basis of the De Officiis (N. D. II § 118), and also in his pupil Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, who was one of Cicero's instructors (N. D. 17 & 123, 11 88), and from whom much of the Stoic argumentation in the N. D. is probably derived.

The end of philosophy with the Stoics was purely practical. Philosophy is identical with virtue. But since virtue consists in bringing the actions into harmony with the general order of the world, it is essential to know what this order is, and thus we arrive at the famous triple division of philosophy into physics, including cosmology and theology, which explains the nature and laws of the universe; logic, which ensures us against deception and supplies. the method for attaining to true knowledge; ethics, which draws the conclusion for practical life. The chief point of interest in the Logic of the Stoics is their theory as to the criterion. They considered the soul to resemble a sheet of blank paper on which impressions (pavraoía) were produced through the senses. The concept (evvola) was produced from the impressions by generalization, which might be either spontaneous and unconscious, giving rise to common ideas or natural anticipations (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις), or it might be conscious and methodical, giving rise to artificial concepts. In entire opposition to Plato they held that the individual object alone had real existence; the universal, the general term, existed only in the mind as subjective thought. The truth or falsehood of these impressions and conceptions depended on their possession of Tò KaтаληTTIKÓν, the power of carrying conviction. An impression which was not merely assented to, but forced itself irresistibly on the mind, was a KataληTTIKÝ þaνraσía, a perception that has a firm grasp of reality. The same irresistible evidence attaches to a πpóAnyus, but artificial concepts required to have their truth proved by being connected with one or other of these criteria.

The physical theory of the Stoics is a pantheistic materialism. The only real existences are such as can act and be acted upon, and these are bodies, for like can only act on like. But these bodies are not moved simply by mechanical laws, as Democritus supposed. The whole universe is an embodied spiritual force, of which we may call one part passive, one part active, but all is alike material. The active portion is soul, a fiery ether pervading the whole, but having its principal seat in the heaven which encompasses it on every side ; the passive portion consists mainly of the inferior elements, water and earth. These latter proceed from the former and are periodically reabsorbed into it in the world-conflagration. The universe itself, as a perfect living creature, is rightly called God, but the name. is more particularly given to the soul of the universe, who is also known by many descriptive appellations, Rational or Artistic Fire (πûp voepóv, tûp texvikóv), All-penetrating Air, Spirit, Reason, Nature, Providence, Destiny, Law, Necessity, the Ruling Principle (rò yeμovikóv), and, with reference to his creative and 'informing' power, the Generative Reason (Móyos σñeрμатɩкós). The gods of the popular religion represented different activities of the one true Deity. The human soul is an emanation from Him. Although it outlives the body, it will only retain its individual existence till the next conflagration, and that only in the case of the wise. The stars being made of pure fire are divine.

In all this we see the influence of Heraclitus, who was much quoted by the Stoics, though the distinction of the active and passive elements in the universe has been with some probability referred back to the Aristotelian distinction between Form and Matter. They agreed with Aristotle also in holding the unity, finiteness and sphericity of the world, but, unlike him, considered that there was an unlimited void beyond it. That which was peculiarly Stoical was the strong moral colouring which they gave to their materialistic system. The all-pervading fire was at the same time the all-seeing Providence who created and governed all things for the best ends, and makes each several existence, each several fact, conspire together for the good of the whole. It is the privilege of man to be able knowingly and willingly to act as a rational part of the rational whole, instead of yielding himself up to irrational and selfish impulse: but however he acts, he must perforce carry out the divine purpose, as Cleanthes says in his noble hymn:

ἄγου δέ μ' ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πεπρωμένη,
ὅποι ποθ ̓ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος·

ὡς ἕψομαι γ ̓ ἄοκνος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω,

κακὸς γενομένος, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι.

From this it follows that the summum bonum is to live according to nature and it is through virtue or wisdom that we are enabled to do this. One who thus lives is autaρкýs, in need of nothing. External good, external evil are matters of indifference; they only provide the Ifield in which virtue is to exercise itself. Pleasure is a natural concomitant of activity, but is not a natural end: not even if we count as pleasure that high delight which belongs to virtuous activity, for pleasure regarded in itself has a tendency to lead man away from the true end, viz. acting not for self, but for the whole. Man's reason being a part of the reason of the universe reveals to him the divine law. As the emotions are liable to confuse or to disobey reason, it is the part of the wise, i. e. of the virtuous, man to uproot them altogether. Wisdom is not only speculative, judging what is in accordance with nature or the divine law, but practical, strongly willing what is thus determined to be right. We may distinguish different virtues in thought, but in fact no virtue can exist apart. He who has a right judgment and right intention is perfectly virtuous, he who is without right judgment and intention is perfectly vicious. There is no mean. The wise man is perfectly happy, the fool perfectly miserable: all the actions of the former are wise and good; all the actions of the latter foolish and bad. There may be a progress towards wisdom, but, until the actual moment of conversion, even those who are advancing (oi #pокÓTTOVTES) must still be classed among the fools. Thus we have the strange union of a highly ideal ethics with a materialistic philosophy. But it was impossible to maintain this uncompromising idealism in practice. The later Stoics found themselves compelled to admit that apart from virtue and vice, the absolute good and evil, there were preferences to be made among things indifferent, from which it followed that besides perfectly virtuous actions (kaтopuara) there was a subordinate class of appropriate actions (kalýκovтa). In the same way, since they were compelled to allow that their perfectly wise man, whom they vaunted to be equal to Zeus, had never existed, they found it necessary to allow a positive value to πрокоý, progress towards wisdom, and to self-control, as contrasted with absolute apathy.

One other characteristic doctrine of the Stoics may be mentioned

GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

THE

LIBRAR UNIVERSITY

CA

here. It will have been noticed that many representative of the
school were not of Greek birth, but only connected with eRNIA.
by the Macedonian conquests. It was easy to rise from this fact
to the higher doctrine which flowed naturally from their first princi-
ple, the doctrine namely that all men were members of one state,
that the world is the common City of Gods and men, that all men
are brethren as having the same Divine Father.

Epicureanism may be roughly described as a combination of the physics of Democritus with the ethics of Aristippus. Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) was an Athenian, born in Samos, where he is said to have received instruction in the doctrines of Plato and Democritus (N. D. 1 72 & 93). He founded his school at Athens about 306 B.C., teaching in his own 'Garden,' which became not less famous than the Stoic 'Porch'. Among his most distinguished disciples were Metrodorus (N. D. 1 86, 113) and others mentioned N. D. 193. Cicero mentions among his own contemporaries Phaedrus, Zeno of Sidon (N. D. 1 59, 93) and Philodemus of Gadara: and his account of the Epicurean doctrines is probably borrowed from these, especially from the last. Epicureanism had great success among the Romans; but, with the exception of the poet Lucretius, none of the Latin expounders of the system seem to have been of any importance. Cicero speaks with great contempt of Amafinius and Rabirius (cf. Tusc. 11 7, and Zeller on the Epicureans, ch. 15).

The end of the Epicurean philosophy was even more exclusively practical than that of the Stoics. Logic (called by Epicurus 'Canonic', as giving the 'canon' or test of truth) and physics, were merely subordinate to ethics, the art of attaining happiness. Knowledge in itself is of no value or interest. In fact it has a tendency to corrupt and distort our natural judgment and feeling: and thus Epicurus prided himself on being mainly self-taught (N. D. 1 72). Truth is based on the senses: our sensations are always to be trusted: error comes in when we begin to interpret them. Repeated sensations produce a permanent image or general notion (Tpóλns, so called because it exists in the mind as an anticipation of the name which would be unmeaning if it could not be referred to a known type). These general notions also are to be trusted as a natural and spontaneous growth. But opinions (voλnyes) about these may be either true or false; true, if testified to by the sensation, or, supposing such direct evidence unattainable, if there is no contrary sensation; false,