and is likely to make discipline degenerate into an engine "of faction.

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Nothing again," adds he (p. 35), " is less likely to "serve the cause of truth, or even the cause of Christian liberty, than making every thing that ought to be done, "wait for discussion in full assembly. If the church contains the collective wisdom, it contains also the collective "ignorance of the brethren: if it combines their gifts and "their graces, it combines also their infirmities and corrup❝tion. Where every thing must undergo discussion, some "may be in danger of thinking they have laws to make, in"stead of laws to obey. A few of the most active spirit "and readiest elocution will become the real movers and managers in every business; and a part will thus be put for "the whole. When they are agreed, every thing must be complied with: when they are at variance, every thing "must be objected to. No tyranny is so bad as that of a "cabal; that is, of those who are uppermost for the mo "ment in the fermentation of anarchy. Debate, when in"dulged, is favourable to the introduction of this sort of tyranny. It heats the passions, warps the judgment; hur"ries men to measures of violence and precipitation; en66 gages them to the side which they happen to have taken ; "inclines them to contention, and tedious consultation, about "matters of the most trivial importance; and makes them "be ever on the watch to satisfy a restless disposition, by "seizing an opportunity to interfere. In short, those who "most need restraint, are, by such means, in danger of being led to set it at defiance; while the peaceful, and those to whom the government is committed nominally, are ter"rified and chained down by the turbulence of the rest.”

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Here I am certain that you cannot fail to perceive the very satisfactory refutation of your sentiments in particular, and of those of Independents in general, with regard to the degree of ecclesiastical power which should be granted to rulers, that is contained in these words, even of a fellow-labourer in your vineyard. In them it is affirmed in the plainest terms, that every measure ought not to be discussed in the presence of church-members, and their opinion and concurrence asked before a decision is made, because, if this were done, the church would be deprived of the benefit of government, continual encouragement would be given to dis, sension, and discipline would degenerate into an engine of

faction. In them, also, it is maintained in terms no less explicit, that the governors are entitled, nay, bound, to carry into effect the rules of scripture, and to require obedience from the church to those rules when laid before them; i. e. (as is evident from the connection) without previously consulting them. And the reasons which are assigned for allowing the rulers to determine in inferior matters, without the advice of the brethren, are much more conclusive for their authoritative decision in those which are more important, without their assistance. If less interesting points, and points which are obvious, are not to wait for discussion in full assembly, because, if the church contain the collective wisdom, it contains also the collective ignorance of the brethren; and if it combines their gifts and their graces, it combines also their infirmities and corruption; much more must it be the duty of the rulers of the church themselves, to decide authoritatively on more momentous matters, and matters which are confessedly more difficult and doubtful*. As

*Not only is it manifest from the argument of Mr. Ewing which is here stated, that it is the office bearers alone, even upon his own principles, who are to judge in important as well as trivial matters without consulting the members; but whatever he intended, the same thing seems to be evident from his other arguments. It is the former alone, he says, who are to decide upon points which are trifling and obvious, because, as he before affirms, "it is the office-bearers "alone who are authorized in scripture to feed the flock," or, as he "explains it, "to govern them by instruction and persuasion according to the word of God." But when the office-bearers are required in the sacred volume to feed, or, as he interprets it, to govern the flock, if it entitle them to determine in inferior matters, and matters which are obvious, without consulting them, is it not equally plain from it, that they must be much more authorised by it to exercise this power in more difficult points? And if the officebearers only, in his opinion, should judge in these less interesting cases, because, as he also asserts, according to the passages which he quotes, "they are entitled, nay, bound by the word of God, in "governing the church, to carry into effect the rules of scripture, "and to require obedience from the church to those rules when laid 44 before them;" the very same expressions, when employed in scripture respecting their power in general, with the obedience of the members, seem as clearly to intimate, that, in every point, the elders are to judge without soliciting the opinion and consent of the members. Are the rules of scripture, which he admits, from these passages, that they are to carry into effect, only trifles? or do they not comprehend every thing the most difficult and important, which can be the

I am persuaded, then, that you will not consider this gentleman as blindly attached to the cause of Presbytery, or in

subject of determination in an ecclesiastical court? If then, as he contends, the office-bearers of the church are warranted, by the passages which he produces in the margin, to carry into effect the laws of Christ without consulting the opinion of the members, and to require obedience from the members to them, when laid before them; and if these laws, as is evident, include not only what is trivial and obvious, but what is important and essential; is it not incontestable, even from the arguments of this gentleman, who professes to be an Independent, that the office-bearers alone, as Presbyterians maintain, are to determine in matters which are important and essential, as well as those which are obvious and trivial?

In short, if it is only in things which are obvious and trivial that the office-bearers alone, in the opinion of Mr. Ewing, are authorized to judge without consulting the members, who are the persons that are to determine whether the matters which are to be the subject of judgment upon any particular occasion, are trivial and obvious, or interesting and doubtful? It cannot be the people, for that would make the men over whom this extraordinary power was to be exercised, the judges of the extent to which it was to be employed, which is considered as impolitic in all proper governments; and it cannot be the office-bearers, for that would be to make the men who are to exercise this power, judges of the extent in which they were to exert it, which has always been considered as no less preposterous. Unless then he can point out a satisfactory standard, separate from the opinion of the office-bearers and the people, by which it can be ascertained what things are trivial and obvious, and what are difficult and important, the commission of such power as that for which he pleads, to the elders of the church, at least upon the principles of Independent societies, whatever they may think of it, seems in the highest degree to be dangerous. Their office-bearers, it appears, according to this gentleman, are themselves to judge in things trivial and obvious, without granting the members a single word or vote; and, at the same time, so far as can be discovered, it is the office-bearers alone who are to say when they are to exercise this extraordinary power, and erect themselves into the only judges in the society. If this be consistent with your notions of liberty, or the first principles of independency, I should be happy to see upon what grounds it can be established?

If the office-bearers, in fine are to judge in less interesting matters only, and are to take the judgment of the people in more important affairs, does not this intimate, that though they are fit for determining what are considered as trifles, they are not equal to the determination of things which are intricate and interesting, and need the superior or combined information of the members? And that though it would be dangerous, from the collected ignorance of the latter, as Mr. Ewing affirms, to allow them to judge in things obvious and trivial, it is perfectly safe to permit them to judge in things dubious and important?

the least disposed to promote its interests, I beg you will attend to the tendency of his reasoning, and, after adjusting the differences among yourselves, honestly declare, whether it does not at once flatly contradict and completely overthrow your favourite position, That ecclesiastical rulers are not authorized authoritatively to decide upon any point which falls under their cognizance, without previously requesting the presence and counsel of the members of the church!

I would observe, moreover, that you yourself have admitted a case (and it has frequently occurred) in which, even in an Independent church, authoritative power must be exercised by your rulers. "Suppose," you say (p. 50), " a "case of discipline to occur in an Independent church, in "which a difference of opinion obtained, how far a charge "was distinctly proved. The church must act in one way "or another. If the party be excluded against whom the "charge is brought, those who think him not guilty, will "take offence at the measure. If, on the other hand, he "be continued in communion without reproof, those who "think him guilty, will be equally offended." A decision notwithstanding must necessarily be made, and the minority you admit must either submit to the majority, or withdraw from their communion. Now, in this instance, I would ask you, if an authoritative power be not used by the majority of this Independent church, without regard to the will of the minority, as much as by any class of Presbyterian rülers? and if they do not act as decidedly, without any regard to the convictions of their brethren? Besides, I would inquire, whether this must not be the case in Independent, as well as Presbyterian churches, in every instance (and they cannot be few) in which a question is carried and acted upon by a majority against a minority? Is not the opinion of the latter uniformly disregarded? Is not the will of the former executed as a law? Can any religious society exist without it? Does not this unquestionably involve of neces sity, as much authority as the decision of any Presbyterian court? And is not the minority obliged as readily to submit to this authoritative determination, if it be an inferior point or if it be a fundamental article, as universally to separate from their former brethren, if they are so disposed, as in Presbyterian churches ?

When a majority, in a word, of any of your churches determines against a minority, that a brother who has happened to offend before all, should be rebuked before all, that he may be taught by it to be ashamed, I should be glad to know, if it is only a simple advice which is delivered? And when such a majority decides against a minority, that a brother is to be excommunicated, and their decision is fulfilled, I should be happy to be informed, if it is only a simple opinion which is stated? This, I believe, you will hardly maintain and consequently, since in these and all other instances, where the will of a majority is carried and acted upon against a minority, from the very nature of things, authority is exercised, I hold it to be unfair and contradictory in Independents to declaim against Presbyterians, when they claim for their rulers, the same portion of authority which is necessarily assumed by the majority of the members in each of their congregations; and without which, whatever persuasion might be employed, and whatever advices might be delivered, not one of their societies can be conceived to exist.

You affirm, however, that to exercise authority without the presence and consent of the members of the church is inconsistent with the spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom, one of the laws of which is, that before a person can perform any acceptable act of worship, he must have, in some measure, a conviction of its fitness and propriety. And you contend, that since a man must first be convinced by persuasion, before he can render any such obedience, autho rity is unnecessary, for if authority is used as well as persuasion, it seems to imply that the latter is insufficient. But in answer to this I would observe, that though authority is claimed by Presbyterian rulers over their members, it is not an unreasonable nor imperious authority. They consider themselves as the servants of the Lord Jesus: the subjection which they demand from the members of their churches, is not to themselves, or to their will, as you insinuate (p. 47), but to what they consider as the will of their blessed Master; and the obedience which they require to their decisions in his name, is not, as you allege, blind and compulsatory, but enlightened and voluntary. Nor do they barely deliver their commands, and enjoin immediate and implicit submission (as one would imagine from your representation); but while they declare authoritatively whatever appears to