For not to infift upon their infufficiency to help him at a dead lift, had he confulted his reason, he must have foreseen the discontents and divifions that it would create in his English Forces; for it fhewed that he repofed a confidence in the Irish, even to a distrust in the fidelity and fufficiency of the rest of his Army, and a diftruft at any time, much more at that would be felt very fenfibly, though toucht never fo lightly; and therefore if he could not be confident of his Army before, he might expect that this would difpofe them to a Revolt upon the firft occafion that they should meet with: Could any thing but Fear dispose him to thofe methods which he took to oppofe the Prince at his firft landing? For as upon a Fright all the Blood retires to the Heart; fo he drew all his Army together, and reckoned himself so much the fafer, by how much lefs diftance any part of his Forces were from him, thereby neglecting the advantage that he had against the Prince of Orange, whom he was certain muft land either in the West or North, and eight or ten thousand men fent down to each of thofe places to receive him at his landing, might either have deftroyed his Army, or elle have broke it fo much, that a fmall fupply of Fresh men in a few days would have made an end of that Matter, if withal he had dispersed a few of his Forces conveniently up and down the reft of England, which would either have wholly prevented, or hindred any confiderable Affistance from coming into the Prince; for the Nation had been rid fo long, that little of the old English Spirit was left, and most who declared for the Prince of Orange proceeded with fo much caution, that they fhewed more Cunning than Courage, as I will

fhew

fhew you by and by; and befides thofe Forces thus placed to prevent any that fhould appear for the Prince, could in a few days joyn that Body that was to attack the Prince when he landed, and have made up a Force confiderable enough to ingage his, that did not exceed 12 or 13000, having loft most of their best Horses, and the Men much weakned and 'difheartned, by the Stormes,and lying long on Shipboard, or had they come on more equal terms, it was doubtful whether they could have kept their ground against an equal number of King James his Army: But had King James his first Body been routed, yet the remainder of his Forces far exceeded in Number the Princes, and would have found him fresh work, over and over, if King James would have ftaid with them. But this Method fo prudent and obvious he refused, and as little made ufe of the other which he took. He quartered all his Army in and about London, till he heard the Prince was landed, when he ordered it to march, and followed it in Perfon, only to expose himself the more, and give the clearer evidence of his Cowardice, for before he came within 40 Miles of his Enemy away he ran as faft as if his whole Army had been routed, his fear fo far prevailing upon him that he durft not ftay to fet the two Armies together by the Ears, in fo much haft was he to get out of England: And being stopt at Feversham, and brought back to White-hall, where he received the Princes Meffage to remove, how meanly did he confent to it? whereas if he had had the least grain of Courage, he might eafily have fecured thofe that brought the Meffage, and cut in pieces the Forces that came with them. To do it he wanted not incouragement by the Bonefires and Huzzahs

with which the City received him; and if he had, it would have ftruck fuch a Confternation upon the Princes Forces, and fo raised the Spirit of his Army, and of the Papists who were then very numerous in London, that it would have fo turned the Tables as to bring the Odds on his fide; but his Fear would not let him fee his advantage, and fo multiplied every thing that was against him, that at any rate he would be gone, and fave his life, though at the Price of his Honour and three Kingdoms: So that if all were true that is reported of his former Prowefs, yet he feems therein to have forct himself and acted a part, for it could not be the effect of Courage and Refolution; and pon the whole atter, never Man (even Nero himfelf) fhewed fo much Fear in any Cafe as King James did in that Matter.

From this we proceeded to confider what it was that fet the flavish Paffion afloat, and we found it. was the Concurrance of three things. First, The Princes Forces. Secondly, The defertion in his Army. Thirdly, The declaration of the Nobility and Gentry in feveral parts of England for the Prince of Orange; and then we inquired which of these weighed moft, and therein firft we took into confideration how far the Princes Forces went in the Marter.

03 It must be confidered that their Numbers could not make them very formidable, fince they did not exceed 12 or 130co Men: That the condition they were in, did not render them very terrible, many of their Men being fick, and all difcouraged by the great Storms, and lying long on Shipboard; moft of their beft, Horfes killed, and the reft rendred almoft unfit for fervice; And that the Dutch

were

were never efteemed very famous for Land fer vice, though they behave themselves very well at Sea. King James was not ignorant of any part of this, And on the other hand, his Army was in great health, and alwayes well paid, and in Number much Superiour to the Princes Forces, by reafon of which, in probability, it must have neceffitated the Prince to get four or five Victories, before he could fecure the Matter, and had loft all his labour, if King James got the better in any one Battle. King James knew he had in his Army of old difciplined Troops, Papist's and biggoted Tories, who in number equalled if not exceeded the Princes Forces, and would have found them, or any fuch Body of Men, work enough upon more equal terms; He very well knew that Englishmen seldom turn their backs, and will go as far as their Officers will lead them, He had a great number of Papifts in his Army, and was fenfible that they thought it to be their Intereft to fight,by reafon that their all lay at ftake, and confidering how their Priests would pufh them on to fight it to the laft man, he might confidently expect if they were ingaged, they would fell their Lives at a dear rate, rather than loose the day: He knew he exceeded the Prince either in Horfe or Foot, even as to the number or goodness of Horfe, in which the ftrength of the Princes Army confifted; And though it may be Objected, That the Prince had with him the greateft General of the World, and a great number of good Officers, and that his were old Troops, and had been in Service; yet the best Officers could not make them more than they were, nor put them into a better condition; It must alfo be confidered, that King James had a great many

2

Men

Men that had been in Service; and new ones mixt with them, would together do as good Service, as if they had all been old Souldiers; and befides, their all then lying at stake, would be fure to make them perform what could be expected from Men, defpair often answering to numbers and the greatest conduct. So that the thought of the Princes Forces could not be the only thing that fent King James away in fuch hafte from Salisbury: For even the Prince though he thought as well of his Men, as he could do of fuch a Number, yet he did not think them fufficient without other affistance to ingage King James his Army, and therefore when he faw fo very few to refort to him after he had been ten or fourteen days on fhore, he began to look towards his Ships, and had certainly gone away if the Scene had not changed very much in four or five days. This therefore makes it pretty plain, that the Princes Forces was not fo very much the occafion of putting King James into fo great a Fright as fomething elte: And therefore in the next place we confidered, how far the desertion in his Army might contribute to it.

Never had any Prince in his Army fo many Men whom he had perfonally obliged, as King James had in his; for whileft he was Duke of York, he was induftrious to gain People of all Qualities, and what he did for any body as well whileft he was Duke of York, as when he was King, was with fo much dispatch and fo good a grace, that his Favours carried with them a double obligation, whereby he got the Character of a steddy Friend, though other things gave him that of an irreconciJable Enemy; and there was in his Army a vast number, whom he had befriended to a great degree,

whom