Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and ComputationAlison Gopnik, Laura Schulz Understanding causal structure is a central task of human cognition. Causal learning underpins the development of our concepts and categories, our intuitive theories, and our capacities for planning, imagination and inference. During the last few years, there has been an interdisciplinary revolution in our understanding of learning and reasoning: Researchers in philosophy, psychology, and computation have discovered new mechanisms for learning the causal structure of the world. This new work provides a rigorous, formal basis for theory theories of concepts and cognitive development, and moreover, the causal learning mechanisms it has uncovered go dramatically beyond the traditional mechanisms of both nativist theories, such as modularity theories, and empiricist ones, such as association or connectionism. |
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... that is particularly important in scientific theory formation. Many scientific hypotheses involve the causal ... That is p(x & y)p(x) * p(y). Two variables are independent in probability conditional on some third variable Z if and only ...
... that is particularly important in scientific theory formation. Many scientific hypotheses involve the causal ... That is p(x & y)p(x) * p(y). Two variables are independent in probability conditional on some third variable Z if and only ...
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... That is, for learning to occur, cues have to be predictive: The probability of the effect given the cue must be greater than the probability of the effect in the absence of the cue. The Rescorla-Wagner theory (R-W theory; 1972) ...
... That is, for learning to occur, cues have to be predictive: The probability of the effect given the cue must be greater than the probability of the effect in the absence of the cue. The Rescorla-Wagner theory (R-W theory; 1972) ...
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... that is “closer” or “more similar” to the actual world than any possible world in which C holds and E does not hold. A set of criteria is then specified for assessing similarity among possible worlds (cf. Lewis, 1979, p.47). The ...
... that is “closer” or “more similar” to the actual world than any possible world in which C holds and E does not hold. A set of criteria is then specified for assessing similarity among possible worlds (cf. Lewis, 1979, p.47). The ...
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... that is of such a character that any change in Y (should it occur) can only come about through the change in X and not in some other way. In other words, we want to rule out the possibility that the intervention on X (or anything that ...
... that is of such a character that any change in Y (should it occur) can only come about through the change in X and not in some other way. In other words, we want to rule out the possibility that the intervention on X (or anything that ...
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... that is psychologically real in people's causal judgments and inferences. I suggest that it does: It is involved in or connected to our ability to separate out means and ends in causal reasoning. It is also centrally involved in the ...
... that is psychologically real in people's causal judgments and inferences. I suggest that it does: It is involved in or connected to our ability to separate out means and ends in causal reasoning. It is also centrally involved in the ...
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Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik,Laura Schulz Limited preview - 2007 |
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