Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and ComputationAlison Gopnik, Laura Schulz Understanding causal structure is a central task of human cognition. Causal learning underpins the development of our concepts and categories, our intuitive theories, and our capacities for planning, imagination and inference. During the last few years, there has been an interdisciplinary revolution in our understanding of learning and reasoning: Researchers in philosophy, psychology, and computation have discovered new mechanisms for learning the causal structure of the world. This new work provides a rigorous, formal basis for theory theories of concepts and cognitive development, and moreover, the causal learning mechanisms it has uncovered go dramatically beyond the traditional mechanisms of both nativist theories, such as modularity theories, and empiricist ones, such as association or connectionism. |
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Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik, Laura Schulz. This page intentionally left blank Contents PART I: Contributors ix Introduction 1 Alison Gopnik and.
Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik, Laura Schulz. This page intentionally left blank Contents PART I: Contributors ix Introduction 1 Alison Gopnik and.
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Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik, Laura Schulz. Contents PART I: Contributors ix Introduction 1 Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz CAUSATION AND INTERVENTION 1 Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological ...
Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik, Laura Schulz. Contents PART I: Contributors ix Introduction 1 Alison Gopnik and Laura Schulz CAUSATION AND INTERVENTION 1 Interventionist Theories of Causation in Psychological ...
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Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik, Laura Schulz. method of examples and counterexamples; philosophers give examples of cases in which everyone agrees that X causes Y and then try to find some generalization that will ...
Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik, Laura Schulz. method of examples and counterexamples; philosophers give examples of cases in which everyone agrees that X causes Y and then try to find some generalization that will ...
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... Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Kalish, 1996; Sobel, 2004). To account for the early emergence of structured, coherent, causal knowledge, some psychologists have suggested that children's early causal representations might be largely innate ...
... Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Kalish, 1996; Sobel, 2004). To account for the early emergence of structured, coherent, causal knowledge, some psychologists have suggested that children's early causal representations might be largely innate ...
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... Gopnik et al., 2004; Waldmann, 1996, 2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). In fact, it may not even explain animal learning. The R-W account predicts neither learned irrelevancy (the fact that an animal first exposed to a cue without any ...
... Gopnik et al., 2004; Waldmann, 1996, 2000; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). In fact, it may not even explain animal learning. The R-W account predicts neither learned irrelevancy (the fact that an animal first exposed to a cue without any ...
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Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation Alison Gopnik,Laura Schulz Limited preview - 2007 |
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