PREFACE. THIS book owes its being to two causes: to the invitation which I received to deliver the Bohlen Lectures in the winter of 1897 (they appear here somewhat amended and amplified); and to the inspiration I have derived from Albrecht Ritschl's great work on Justification and Reconciliation. It would not be fair to make Ritschl responsible for all that I have written. Considerable portions are independent of Ritschl, in certain parts I have ventured to disagree with him, and in the last two chapters I have entered upon subjects which Ritschl hardly touches. Nevertheless, the main trend of thought and the method are Ritschlian. I have not aimed at giving an exposition or a criticism of Ritschl. If these pages have any value, it comes from the mental appropriation of certain great truths in the exigencies of a profession which finds itself constantly confronted and challenged by the mystery of human life. These things are in the air, and I shall never forget my pleasure when, many years ago, I found Ritschl made those words of Christ the corner-stone of his system, which had long stood out in my mind as perhaps the most significant he uttered: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." Ritschl's critics have been right in distinguishing his attitude towards metaphysics as the crucial point of his system, but have generally, I think, done him something less than justice. I have become more and more assured in the conviction that his position is well taken. I have endeavoured to make that position clear, and I should like to hope that it might be my privilege to convince some, to whom the problems of theology are a matter of vital concern, that there is something in Ritschl's contention which is worth their thoughtful and sober consideration. The system of one, concerning whom it could be said The joy of preaching the gospel entire and alone has been awakened by no theologian of the past decades to a greater degree than by Ritschl" (Nippold), cannot be overlooked by the intelligent and ought to be above the sarcasm with which its critics have sometimes thought to refute it. 66 A friend, whose opinion I highly value, when I undertook this work wrote to me about the subject: "I do not doubt you will treat it not as a finality." The words set me thinking. A claim to finality would indicate arrant conceit in whoever made it, and yet we should never lose sight of the fact that there is such a thing as finality in truth. All contemporary thought is under the influence of the historical spirit, which is dominant in the intellectual sphere; and it is one of the serious faults of Ritschl's writing that he fails clearly to distinguish between the historical and the philosophical, or religious, ideal. |