A. If this disposition were universal, the world would be a society of friends; if the other, it would produce a scene of universal contention.

Q. But suppose, as it is, the disposition to be par

tial?

A. Then, in whatever degree it prevails, in the same proportion it allays and prevents quarrels. Without this disposition, enmities must not only be frequent, but, once begun, must be eternal.

Q. But may not a general or statesman arise from the former character, and be the instrument of great benefits to mankind?

A. Yes; but this is nothing more than what is true of many qualities acknowledged to be vicious. Envy is a quality of this sort.

Q. How did our Saviour display his love of the character we are defending.

A. By his repeated correction of the disciples' ambition; his censure of the love of distinction among the Scribes and Pharisees; his inculcation of humility. (Matt. xxiii. 6.)

Q. Does not our Lord's advice extend to what we call manners.

A. It seems to do so (Luke xiv. 7), nor was this so much beneath his dignity as may at first sight be supposed; for bad manners are bad morals.

Q. Does not the disposition, inculcated by these precepts relate to personal conduct, from personal

motives?

A. Yes; when it comes to be considered what is

necessary to be done for the public welfare, it comes to a case to which these rules do not belong.

Q. Is not the preference of the patient to the heroic character, a peculiarity in the Christian Institution? A. It is; a peculiarity which I propose as an argument of wisdom beyond the natural character of the person who delivered it.

Q. What is the second argument from the morality of the New Testament?

A. The stress which Christ laid upon the regulation of the thoughts. The other consideration related to the malicious passions; this to the voluptuous (Matt. xv. 19, and xxiii. 25, 27.)

Q. As the propensities of nature must be regulated, where ought the check to be placed?

A. In these texts Christ has pronounced decisively. He makes the control of thought essential, and this is the only successful discipline; a moral system, prohibiting actions, but leaving thoughts at liberty, will be ineffectual, and is therefore unwise.

Q. What would have been deemed a judicious an swer from a teacher of morality to a person inquiring for a short rule of life and general principle of conduct?

A. If he had instructed him "constantly to refer his actions to what he believed to be the will of his Creator, and constantly to have in view, not his own qualification alone, but the happiness of those about him," he would have been thought to have given a

judicious answer, even in the most improved state of morals.

Q. Has not Christ said this?

A. Yes; what we have supposed the most applauded philosopher of the most enlightened age, would have deemed worthy of his wisdom and character (Matt. xxii. 35, 40), in his answer to the lawyer.

Q. Does it detract from the merit of the answer, that these precepts are extant in the Mosaic code ?

A. I think not much; his selecting them from the rest of that voluminous institution, stating them as the sum of all the others, and proposing them for a rule and principle, were all Christ's own.

Q. Do not Christ's expressions on the subject appear to have fixed the sentiment among his followers?

A. Yes; Paul has it expressly (Rom. xiii. 7) John also (1 John iv. 2), and Peter not very differently (1 Peter i. 22), and it is well known, that this regard to the welfare of others runs through all the preceptive parts of the Apostolic writings.

Q. Is not this temper among succeeding Christians attested by one of the best and earliest of the Apostolic fathers?

A. It is; by Clemens Romanus in his epistle, throughout which Christian meekness runs.

Q. Does not this sacred principle mix with all the writings of the age?

A. Yes; there are more quotations in the Apėstolic fathers of texts relating to these points than to any other.

Q. What is the fourth quality by which Christian morality is distinguished?

A. By the exclusion of regard to fame and reputation (Matt. vi. 1, 6), and the rule, by parity of reason, is extended to other virtues.

Q. Is the pursuit of fame in this or in other passages of the New Testament stated as a vice?

A. I think not; it is only said, that an action to be virtuous must be independent of it. From the motive, the advantages of the deed to ourselves, must be shut out.

Q. Is not this exclusion of regard to human opinion a difference not so much in the duties to which teachers of virtue would persuade mankind, as in the manner and topics of persuasion ?

A. Yes; for when we give advice, it is full of references to the advantages of character; but true virtue discards these considerations absolutely, and retires from them all to the single internal purpose of pleasing God; this, at least, was the virtue which Christ taught.

Q. Was not the manner of Christ's teaching also extremely peculiar?

A. It was; his lessons did not consist of disquisitions; his instructions were conveyed in short, emphatic, sententious rules, in occasional reflections, or in round maxims.

Q. What circumstances show the necessity Christ was under of comprising what he delivered in a small compass?

A. His ministry compared with his work, was of short duration; he had many places to visit, various audiences to address, and was frequently driven by persecution.

Q. Should not the Sermon on the mount be eonsidered with a view to these observations?

A. Yes; and though Lardner thought that this discourse was made up of Christ's sayings at different times, it may still be concluded that Christ delivered this discourse at the time and place, and in the manner related by St. Matthew, although the same maxims might have been repeated on different

occasions.

Q. What is incidental to this mode of instruction? A. The rules will be conceived in absolute terms, leaving the application to the hearer; the terms will be by so much the more forcible as they have to encounter general propensities.

Q. What is to be remarked of those strong instances in the sermon, such as (Matt. v. 39), which are in the form of specific precepts ?

A. That the specific compliance would be of little value, but the disposition inculcated, of the highest.

Q. Suppose it should be objected, that this dispo sition is unattainable?

A. So is all perfection; ought, therefore, a moralist to recommend imperfections? I repeat, that these