L. B. S. of THE desire of affording a means by which a more intimate knowledge DR. PALEY'S Evidences of Christianity may be easily attained, has led to the compilation of the present work. In the prosecution of his design, the Compiler has been careful to preserve the substance of the arguments, though necessarily in a compressed form; and whenever it was compatible with brevity, he has expressed the Questions and Answers in PALEY'S own words. The numerous and extensive quotations from Scripture in the original work, rendered their insertion impracticable, but in every case where the nature of the arguments made it indispensable, he has given references to the texts themselves. If a perusal of this tract should produce in any one, who has shrunk from the more extensive study of the entire work, a desire to possess a thorough knowledge of the masterly and candid arguments which it contains, he will not regret the hours which he may have devoted to the acquisition of powerful weapons, with which he may not only successfully contend against the objections of others, but may effectually defend and maintain his own convictions. CAMBRIDGE, FEB. 14, 1824. PALEY'S EVIdences. PREPARATORY CONSIDERATIONS. Q. WHAT is the substance of the preparatory considerations? A. The antecedent credibility of miracles. Q. How is the probability of a revelation proved? A. By supposing that the world had a Creator, studious of the happiness of his creatures, a portion of which he had endowed with faculties capable of moral obedience to his will, and for whom he destined a future state in which their situation would depend on their conduct in the first state; and if it were necessary, from any circumstances, that they should know what was so destined for them, which they could not without revelation, that it is not improbable that God should acquaint them with it. Q. How is the intervention of miracles accounted for? A. As it appears that revelation could not be made but by miracles, in the same degree that it is probable that a revelation should be given, it is probable that miracles should take place. Q. But are not the attributes of the Deity, and the existence of a future state assumed in order to prove the reality of miracles? B A. No; for that reality must be always proved by evidence; since we only assert, that in these miracles there is no such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. Q. What are the two propositions from the probability or improbability of which this assertion is maintained? A. 1st, That a future state should be destined by God for the human creation; and 2nd, that being so destined he should acquaint him with it. Q. Is it necessary that these propositions should be capable of proof? A. No; it is enough to be able to say, that either the propositions themselves, or the facts strictly connected with them, are not so violently improbable as that they ought to be rejected at first sight, though supported by any strength or complication of evidence. Q. To what length does a modern objection to miracles go? A. To the assertion that no human testimony can in any case render them credible. Q. What is the principle on which this objection professes to be founded? A. That it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false. Q. Mention the ambiguity of the term expe rience ? A. Strictly speaking, a thing is contrary to ex |